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Indonesia  is  the  world’s  largest  archipelagic  state,  and  one  of  the  most  spatially 
diverse  nations  on  earth  in  its  resource  endowments,  population  settlements, 
location  of  economic  activity,  ecology  and  ethnicity.  The  regional socio-economic 
data base now extends over 30 years, and so it is possible to draw conclusions 
about the country’s regional development dynamics since the 1970s. In this paper, 
we examine economic growth, inequality, convergence, structural change and social 
indicators for a consolidated group of 26 provinces, ie, the 27 of the late Soeharto 
period excluding East Timor.  
 
Our major conclusions include the following: (a) There continues to be great diversity 
in  economic  and  social  outcomes,  but  growth  and  social  progress  have  been 
remarkably even. The poorest regions, mainly located in Eastern Indonesia, have 
generally performed about as well as the national average. (b) The better performing 
regions are typically those that are the most ‘connected’ to the global economy. In 
this respect, Jakarta stands out as a special case, growing richer than the rest of the 
country  over  time.  (c)  As  expected,  conflict  is  particularly  harmful  to  economic 
development, as illustrated in the case of Maluku and to a lesser extent Aceh. (d) 
There is no clear natural resource story, in that the performance of the resource-rich 





With its 13,000 islands, Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic state, and one 
of the most spatially diverse nations on earth in its resource endowments, population 
settlements, location of economic activity, ecology and ethnicity. There are about 
350 identified ethnic groups. In the early 2000s, per capita regional product in the 
richest province, East Kalimantan, is around 16 times that of the poorest, Maluku. 
The range of poverty incidence is from 3.4% of the population in Jakarta to 42% in 
Papua. 
 
The country’s regional development patterns are therefore of great analytical and 
policy interest.  Indonesia is  formally  a unitary  state, but all national governments 
have  had  to  deal  with  major  regional  development  challenges.  The  country’s 
international boundaries have changed twice since Independence, with the formal 
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entry of Papua (then Irian) in 1969, and the entry and later exit of East Timor in 1976 
and 1999 respectively. Sub-national boundaries have changed frequently. 
 
While  national  economic  fortunes  and  policies  also  explain  much  of  the  local 
development  outcomes,  regional  responses  to  international  and  domestic  events 
inevitably vary. Four examples briefly illustrate this proposition.  
 
First, the 1970s oil boom disproportionately benefited the country’s four resource-
rich  provinces,  even  though  much  of  the  windfall  gains  accrued  to  the  central 
government  and  oil  companies.  Second,  the  major  policy  reforms  of  the  1980s 
resulted in rapid, export-oriented industrialization, mainly concentrated on Java and 
Bali, and which in turn boosted the economic fortunes of these islands. Third, the 
economic  crisis  of  1997/98  particularly  affected  the  modern  sector  construction, 
finance and import substituting manufacturing sectors and, since these are mainly 
located on Java, particularly Jakarta and West Java, these regions experienced the 
sharpest  decline  in  economic  activity.  Fourth,  the  decentralization  program  has 
transferred  considerable  financial  resources  and  administrative  authority from the 
central government to the second-level tiers of government (kabupaten and kota), 
and in the process it is likely to significantly alter Indonesia’s economic geography.  
 
While  much  has  been  written  on  various  aspects  of  regional  development  in 
Indonesia, there are two reasons to revisit the issue. These in turn constitute the 
motivation for this paper. First, it has only been possible to accurately measure and 
quantify  regional  trends  since  the  mid  1970s.  Development  dynamics  are  a  long 
term phenomenon, involving decades rather than years, and we are only now in a 
position  to  analyze  Indonesia’s  regional  economic,  social  and  demographic 
development over a period of 30 years. 
 
The second motivation has to do with the renaissance of regional economics and 
science in recent years. Traditionally regarded as inhabiting the backwaters of the 
profession,  ‘new  economic  geography  has  come  of  age’  in  the  words  of  Neary 
(2001).  This  has  arisen  principally  owing  to  the  intellectual  fusion  between 
international  trade  and  geography.  As Krugman (1991, p. 3), the most influential 
contributor in this field, has argued: 
 
‘… one of the best ways to understand how the international economy 
works is to start by looking at what happens inside nations. If we want 
to  understand  differences  in national growth rates, a good place to 
start  is  by  examining  differences  in  regional  growth;  if  we  want  to 
understand international specialization, a good place to start is with 
local specialization.’  
 
A key insight from this literature concerns the interaction between the international 
economy  and  local  development  patterns.  As  countries  remove  regulatory 
impediments  to  the  cross-border  flow  of goods, services, capital, technology  and 
people, those regions most connected to the global economy – by dint of location, 
infrastructure and enabling institutions – are likely to grow the most quickly. In cases 
where  domestic  infrastructure  lags,  or  there  are  regulatory  barriers  to  domestic 
commerce, these internationally oriented regions may become in effect enclaves, 
more connected to the global economy than to the hinterland. 
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As  a  corollary,  to  the  extent  that  national  economic  policies  –  openness, 
macroeconomic management, etc – are tending to converge around the world, local 
level  governance  and  institutions  are  likely  to  become  increasingly  important 
determinants  of  regional  development  outcomes.  In  the  search  for  markets  and 
mobile factors, for example, Jakarta is competing with both Surabaya and Shanghai, 
albeit in different dimensions. 
 
There are numerous unresolved issues in this new economic geography literature. 
For example, is the notion of convergence as relevant to intra-country development 
as it is to international comparisons? In turn, are the variables that are presumed to 
be important determinants of national growth rates also relevant to an understanding 
of  regional  (sub-national)  growth?  Does  the  Williamson  (1965)  conjecture,  of  a 
Kuznets-type  relationship  between  regional  inequality  and  national  development, 
receive empirical support? 
 
At a policy level, too, much remains unresolved. A generally accepted notion might 
be  that  regional  policy is anything that  affects the  allocation of resources across 
regions. If this is the case, then regional policy formally defined is likely to have a 
relatively minor impact on regional dynamics. For example, of the four key events 
mentioned above in the Indonesian context, only one – the decentralization program 
–  was  an  example  of  explicit  regional  policy.  There  are  also  many  different 
modalities  of  regional  policy,  ranging  from  formula-driven  allocation  of  financial 
resources,  through  to  specific  delegations  of  authority  from  central  governments, 
and  a  range  of  region-specific  programs  such  as  those  targetting  so-called  by-
passed regions. 
 
This paper will draw on this rapidly expanding literature and the now rich Indonesian 
regional  data  base  to  address  the  following  issues,  each  of  which  constitutes  a 
section of the paper. 
 
First, in section 2 we provide an overview of Indonesia’s changing regional economic 
geography, examining how the location of economic activity and provincial economic 
rankings have changed since the 1970s. We also consider whether regional price 
variations  affect these conclusions. Next, in section 3, we investigate patterns  of 
regional economic growth and structural change. Here we examine regional growth 
dynamics, followed by the interrelationships between growth, structural change and 
demographic  dynamics.  Section  4  examines  convergence  and  inequality,  both  in 
terms of the ‘four-quadrants’ story of initial incomes and subsequent growth and the 
various measures of convergence. These results are compared with convergence 
estimates  for  other  countries,  and with Indonesia’s provincial social indicators.  In 
section 5 we focus on conflict at the regional level, and assess various explanatory 
hypotheses.  This  section  is  exploratory,  particularly  owing  to  data  limitations.  In 
section 6 we summarize our main findings. 
 
To  address  these  issues,  we  have  assembled  a  large  regional  data  base  from 
various series of Indonesia’s Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). These data are discussed 
in  detail in the  relevant sections, but  we note  here  two  general  points. First, the 
analysis is conducted at the provincial level and is based on a standard set of 26 
provinces. These are the 27 provinces that existed for most of the Soeharto era, 
excluding the special case of East Timor. Since 2000, there has been considerable 
fragmentation (pemekaran) of provincial boundaries, and so it is necessary to adjust   Page 4 of 29 
the  published  data  back  to  the  pre-2000  provincial  boundaries.
1  We  have  also 
resisted  the  temptation  to  conduct  the  analysis  at  second-level  administrative 
boundaries.  The  data  series  span  a  shorter  time  period  (generally  from  the  late 




The  second  general  point  to  note  is  that,  reflecting  data  constraints,  our  story 
commences in the 1970s, the period when reliable regional socio-economic data 
became available (see Arndt, 1973). In the case of demographic and related data 
the  starting  point  is  the  1971  Population  Census,  while  the  regional  accounts 
effectively commence in 1975. 
 
 
(2) Indonesia’s Economic Geography: An Overview 
 
In this section, we address the following questions. Where are the principal locations 
of economic activity, and have they changed over time? Which provinces have the 
highest level of economic welfare and have these rankings changed over time? Are 
the latter measures sensitive to the selection of economic welfare measures, and do 
regional price differentials make a difference? We later sum up with some general 
observations on Indonesia’s changing economic geography since the 1970s. 
 
As  is  well  known  in  the  Indonesian  context,  there  are  two  relevant  measures  of 
regional  economic  activity  and  three  indicators  of  economic  welfare.  There  is  no 
‘true’ measure of economic activity and welfare, as each one measures a different 
concept. We therefore present and examine below the three series.  
 
The  activity  measures  are  Gross  Regional  (Domestic)  Product  (GRP)  and  GRP 
excluding  mining,  in  particular  oil  and  gas.  The  latter  measure  is  frequently 
employed  in  Indonesia  owing  to  the  presence  of  extractive  activities  which 
significantly affect measured local economic activity but have much less effect on 
local economic and social welfare. This difference between the two series arises 
because  a  large  proportion  of  the  returns  to  extractive  activities  accrue  to  extra-
provincial entities, principally the central government, and foreign and domestically 
owned mining companies. With the introduction of the decentralization measures in 
January 2001, regions now receive a higher proportion of mining revenue, and thus 




                                                
1 Thus, for example, ‘West Java’ refers to the currently existing provinces of West 
Java and Banten, ‘North Sulawesi’ to North Sulawesi and Gorontalo, and so on. 
2 For example, since 1997, the number of provinces has risen from 26 (ie, excluding 
East Timor) to 33, while the number of second-level districts has risen from 341 to 
more than 456 by the end of 2006. 
3  Commencing  in  January  2001,  the  regions  receive  80%,  15%  and  30%  of  the 
government’s net returns from timber, gas and oil revenues. Note that most of these 
revenues  flow  to  kabupaten/kota  rather  than  the  provinces.  Since  2002  special 
arrangements have been in place for the province of Papua, whereby it receives 
80%, 70% and 70% of net returns from timber, gas, and oil revenues respectively.   Page 5 of 29 
In  principle,  the  output  of  any  ‘enclave’  activity  might  be  deducted  from  GRP  to 
provide a better indication of local economic activity and welfare. In practice, the 
choice is between oil and gas, and mining. Other resource-based activities, notably 
forestry,  are  substantially  more  labour  intensive  and  therefore  have  larger  local 
employment  and  income  spinoffs.  Some  mining  activities  are  also  quite  labour-
intensive (eg, small-scale gold mining), and therefore perhaps do not need to be 
deducted from GRP. But in practice the distinction is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. 
 
In this paper, we employ GRP and non-mining GRP. The latter is selected for two 
reasons. First, the non-mining GRP series is available for a longer time period – 
since  1975  as  compared  to  1983  for  the  non-oil  series.
4  Second,  the  difference 
between the non-mining and non-oil series is not large, as oil and gas are the major 
component of Indonesian mining output, accounting for 68% of mining value added 
in 2004. The only regional exception, that is of a very large non-oil mining sector, is 
Papua. 
 
In  addition  to  GRP  and  non-mining  GRP,  there  are  estimates  of  personal 
consumption expenditure (PCE) per capita. The latter are available for a shorter time 
period,  since  1983.  They  are  particularly  useful  for  computing  poverty estimates. 
They  would  not  be  regarded  as  a  superior  indicator  of  economic  welfare  –  by 
definition they exclude personal saving and government consumption and saving – 
but rather they provide an additional dimension. This series would be expected to 
correlate more closely with non-mining GRP. 
 
We present the regional accounts data at three points of time, 1975 (1983 for the 
PCE  data),  1990,  and  2004.  These  correspond  to  important  time  periods  in 
Indonesia’s recent economic history. These are, respectively, the early years of the 
oil  boom,  the  year  at  which  the  major  post  oil-boom  policy  reforms  had  been 
introduced, and the year at which income per capita nationally had returned to pre-
crisis levels. 
 
(2.1) Major Concentrations of Economic Activity 
 
It is convenient initially to divide the country into five major island groupings, Java-
Bali,  Sumatra,  Kalimantan,  Sulawesi,  and  ‘Eastern  Indonesia’.
5  Java  dominates 
Indonesia’s  economy,  in  2004  contributing  almost  60%,  64%  and  66%  of  the 
country’s  total  GDP,  non-mining  GDP  and  household  expenditure  respectively. 
Sumatra comes next, with 22%, 20% and 20%. Kalimantan has 9%, 8% and 5%, 
Sulawesi 4% on all measures, and the Eastern provinces around 3%. We examine 
the factors underlying these regional dynamics in the following section. 
 
        (Table 1 about here) 
 
Over  time,  and  regardless  of  the  measure  used,  there  has  been  a clear  shift  of 
economic activity towards Java-Bali, and in particular the national capital Jakarta. 
Jakarta generated one-sixth of Indonesian GDP in 2004, double that of 1975. Its 
                                                
4 For simplicity, we henceforth use the phrase ‘non-oil’ to refer to ‘non-oil and gas’. 
5 Note that there are various definitions of the latter, ranging from the grouping used 
here to a broader one including Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Bali. The current official 
definition comprises Kalimantan, Sulawesi and all the Eastern islands except Bali.   Page 6 of 29 
share  of  non-mining  GDP  has  also  increased  significantly,  though  not  as  fast.  It 
accounts for virtually all of the increase in the Java-Bali share of GDP, and more 
than  100%  of  the  increase  in  non-mining  GDP.  That  is,  the  Java-Bali  share 
excluding Jakarta is stable for the total GRP series, while declining slightly for the 
other two series. In fact, the increase in Jakarta’s share is under-stated, as some of 
its growth has spilled over the border to West Java, the only other province in the 
group with an increased share of GDP. The three big Java provinces – these two 
and East Java – account for half of Indonesia’s GDP and a slightly higher share of 
non-mining GDP.   
 
Sumatra’s share of non-mining GDP and household expenditure has been stable at 
20-21%. Its share of GDP has been declining, owing to the falling share of oil/gas in 
the national economy, and reflected in the declining shares for the island’s main 
producers, Riau and Aceh. The two largest economies have been Riau with mining 
included and North Sumatra in the case of non-mining GRP. Riau is a particularly 
unusual  regional  economy,  with  a  large  oil  enclave,  a  cash  crop  economy,  a 
relatively  wealthy  capital  city,  and  a  strong  export-oriented  manufacturing  and 
service economy in the islands adjacent to Singapore.
6 Thus, although its share of 
national GDP has declined since 1975 owing to the oil effects, its share of national 
non-mining GDP (and household expenditure) has more than doubled since 1990, 
the fastest increase in the country for this period.  
 
Also  of  note  is  the  fact  that  the  three  southern  provinces  of  Sumatra,  South 
Sumatra, Bengkulu and Lampung, have been slipping. In 2004 their share of non-
mining  GDP  was  about  two-thirds  of  that  in  1975.  Evidently,  their  proximity  to 
stronger economies to their south and north has not had a growth spillover effect. 
Lampung in particular was seen as a solution to Java’s alleged problems of over-
population and poverty, but since the 1970s its economic performance has lagged 
behind that of Java. 
 
The largest and most dynamic regional economy in Kalimantan is East Kalimantan, 
with its large oil and gas resources.  In fact, it has experienced ‘twin booms’ in the 
words  of  Pangestu  (1989),  from  both  its  hydrocarbons  and  timber.  Downstream 
industrial  processing  has  provided  a  further  boost,  while  since  2001  the 
decentralization  program  is  further  enriching kabupaten Kutai Kartanegara, which 
has  the  nation’s  highest  per  capita  GRP.
7  Both  GRP  series  are  however  a 
misleading indicator of the region’s living standards, as indicated by the much lower 
share of household expenditure. Nevertheless, the latter is growing quickly, rising 
50% as a proportion of the national total since 1990. 
 
The  share  of  the  eight  Eastern  provinces  in  the  national  economy  is  gradually 
declining. This generalization applies to the largest regional economy in the East, 
South Sulawesi, and its traditionally most prosperous region, North Sulawesi. The 
share of Maluku, the site of the country’s most serious religious conflict, is now less 
than one-third of the 1975 figure. The only exceptions to this picture of declining 
shares are the two small Sulawesi provinces, boosted by in-migration, West Nusa 
                                                
6 See Rice (1989) for an earlier survey. The province has since been subdivided, 
with the off-shore islands now the province of Riau Islands. 
7  The  revenues  of  all  kabupaten  and  kota  governments  in  the  province  have 
increased by at least 300% since the 2001 decentralization.   Page 7 of 29 
Tenggara,  which  recently  experienced  a  major  mining  expansion,  and household 
expenditure in Papua since 1990. The latter reflects the combined effects of the 
mining boom and special government programs.
8 
 
The analysis above is with reference to provincial economic activity. There are two 
reasons why it is desirable to probe below the provincial boundaries. First, some 
concentrations of economic activity straddle provincial boundaries. Second, some 
provinces have unusual spatial patterns of economic activity. Unfortunately, owing to 
the  rapid  fragmentation  of  kabupaten/kota  borders  since  1998,  it  is  beyond  the 
scope of this paper to compute consistent estimates of economic activity over the 
period 1975-2004. We therefore present estimates just for 2004. 
 
 
(2.2) Provincial Economic Rankings 
 
We examine these rankings with reference to the three measures discussed above. 
All data are normalized around the national average of 100. There are large inter-
provincial  income  and  welfare  differences,  and  evidence  of  both  continuity  and 
change  in  these  rankings  (Table  2).  In  2004,  the  gap  between  the  richest  and 
poorest provinces was very large, depending on which series is used. The ratio of 
the richest to poorest is 15.9 for per capita GRP (East Kalimantan:Maluku), 14.7 for 
per capita non-mining GRP (Jakarta:Maluku), and 11.3 for household expenditure 
(Jakarta:West Nusa Tenggara).  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
The first three columns indicate how the inclusion of mining inflates the regional per 
capita GRP estimates for the resource-rich regions, especially in the earlier years. 
For example, in the case of Riau, GRP per capita was nine times higher than non-
mining GRP in 1975. By 2004, these effects were much smaller. The total series 
were about 37% higher in Aceh, 52% in Riau (and also in West Nusa Tenggara 
owing to its recent mining expansion), 63% in East Kalimantan, and almost double in 
Papua. In the first and last of these provinces non-mining GRP had fallen below the 
national average. 
 
We  therefore  develop  our  main  story  around  the  non-mining  GRP  series,  which 
excludes the enclave mining effects. We identify what may be termed consistently 
‘wealthy’  and  ‘poor’  regions,  those  close  to  the  national  average,  and  those  that 
have experienced a significant change in relative incomes. 
 
(a) ‘Consistently Wealthy’ 
 
There are two really wealthy provinces, Jakarta and East Kalimantan. Jakarta is now 
by far the richest province as measured by non-mining GRP per capita, at about four 
times the national average and double the next richest province. It has been getting 
relatively  richer,  especially  since  1990.  This  is  notwithstanding  first,  the  1980s 
liberalizations,  which  reduced  the  regulatory  powers  of  the  capital,  second,  the 
                                                
8 In 2002, following the introduction of special autonomy measures, the budget of 
the Papuan provincial government was three times that of 1999/2000 in nominal 
terms.   Page 8 of 29 
decentralization of 2001, which transferred resources and funds to the regions, and 
third,  the  1997-98  crisis  which  affected  it  more severely than any other province 
apart  from  West  Java.
9  However,  it  also  recovered  more  quickly  than  most 
provinces. It should also be noted that, in spite of its role as the national capital, the 
public sector is one of the smallest in the country.  
 
East  Kalimantan’s  per  capita  non-mining  GRP  is  always  at  least  three  times the 
national average, indicating that its economic wealth extends well beyond the mining 
enclaves.  However,  its  household  expenditure  suggests  that  community  living 
standards are much closer to the national average. About 60% of East Kalimantan’s 
non-mining GRP comes from oil and gas processing industries. These are relatively 
capital-intensive activities, and much of the return on these investments accrues to 
entities outside the province. 
 
A third province, Riau, is generally well above the national averages for both non-oil 
series. Its fortunes declined sharply during the 1980s in the wake of the fading oil 
boom,  resulting  in  its  income/expenditure  being  close  to  the  national  average. 
However, as noted, strong growth in the islands close to Singapore, combined with 
export-oriented  cash  crops  on  the  mainland,  resulted  in  it  being  the  third  richest 
province in 2004 according to both series. 
 
(b) ‘Consistently Non-Poor’ 
 
A second group of provinces may be termed consistently well-off, with non-mining 
GRP per capita at least 85% of the national average. This includes the traditionally 
strongest  agricultural  exporter,  North  Sumatra,  the  frontier  province  of  Central 
Kalimantan  (initially  driven  by  timber  but  in  which cash  crops are  now the  major 
agricultural  activity),  the  country’s  two  major  industrial  provinces,  West  and  East 
Java  (the  latter’s  ranking  rising  appreciably),  the  major  tourist  region,  Bali,
10  and 
West Sumatra (where both agriculture and a range of services are important). Aceh 
would have belonged in this group until recently, but the protracted conflict (at least 
until 2005) has resulted in sharply lower living standards. 
 
(c) ‘Very Poor’ 
 
At the other extreme are the poor provinces, with a ratio of about half the national 
average or less. They are all located in Eastern Indonesia. The two Nusa Tenggara 
provinces are consistently poor, and evidently slipping further behind, from just over 
half the national average in both series to 35-40%. Maluku, the most serious case of 
conflict  since  1998,  has fallen sharply, from above the  national  average (in  non-
mining GRP per capita) to one-third of it. Southeast Sulawesi, the poorest province 
on this island, is about half the national figure in all series.  
 
(d) ‘Slipping Behind’ 
                                                
9 In 1997-98, the economies of Jakarta and West Java contracted by about 50% 
more than that of the economy as a whole. This was explained mainly by the effects 
in finance, construction and import-substituting manufacturing, all disproportionately 
important in these two provinces (Akita and Alisjahbana, 2002). 
10 But note that Bali’s position has slipped significantly since the 1990s, mainly due 
to the downturn in international tourism following the terrorist incidents.   Page 9 of 29 
 
A number of provinces have slipped significantly in their rankings in both the non-
mining  GRP  and  expenditure  series.  These  are  mainly  traditional  agricultural 
exporters  that  have  not  been  able  to  capitalize  on  initial  advantages.  Examples 
include  South  Sumatra,
11  Jambi,  Bengkulu  (all  in  Sumatra),  West  and  South 
Kalimantan,  North  and  South  Sulawesi,  and  resource-rich  Papua  (though  its 
household  expenditure  has  risen).  It  is  notable  also  that  Central  Java  and 
Yogyakarta  have  slipped  according  to  both  series,  although  not  as  much  as  the 
others in this group. The latter case is puzzling given its traditional importance as a 
major centre of higher education. This is such a heterogeneous group of provinces 
as to render hazardous any attempt at a common set of explanations. Perhaps the 
most  important  observation  is  that  they  generally  lack  a  major,  internationally-
oriented engine of growth. We return to this issue shortly. 
 
These inter-provincial rankings shed much light on Indonesian regional dynamics. In 
the  first  three  decades  of  Indonesian  Independence,  Java  was  regarded  as  the 
country’s most serious development challenge, with the island ‘asphyxiating for want 
of land’ in the words of Keyfitz (1965, p. 503). By contrast, in spite of their poorer 
human and physical infrastructure, the resource rich regions in the ‘Outer Islands’ 
were considered to have less poverty and better development prospects. 
 
However, from the 1980s a different picture emerges. The major economic policy 
reforms  increased  the  relative  profitability  of  export-oriented  manufacturing,  and 
related  higher  value  services,  which  are  located  mainly  on  Java-Bali.  Declining 
commodity  prices  adversely  affected  many  off-Java  regions.  Thus,  Sumatra’s 
ranking on all three series declined significantly. It was overtaken by Java-Bali by 
1990,  and  was  below  the  national  average  for  both  series  in  1990  and  2004.  A 
particularly noticeable decline is Lampung, historically seen as the solution to Java’s 
‘population problem’. In 2004, its income and expenditures were less than half those 
of Java-Bali in all three series. 
 
Kalimantan  displays  above  income  but  below  average  expenditure,  owing  to  the 
distributional effects of the natural resource sectors. The eight provinces of Eastern 




(2.3) Do Regional Price Variations Matter?  
 
The relativities in Table 2 are measured at current prices and make no allowance for 
inter-provincial  variations  in  prices.  These  are  known  to  be  large  in  Indonesia, 
reflecting its vast and unusual geography, the limited spread of infrastructure, and 
barriers  to  inter-regional  commerce.  The  non-mining  GRP  and  household 
expenditure series are also interpreted as indicators of relative living standards, and 
therefore should be adjusted for price differentials. 
                                                
11 After having one of the highest per capita incomes in the country, this province 
has slipped more than most in this group. Part of the explanation is that it was one 
of the first oil refining centres in the country, with Pertamina’s Musi plant. However, 
this large sector of its economy has grown slowly since the 1970s and, unlike Riau, 
new growth engines have yet to emerge, apart from palm oil.   Page 10 of 29 
 
We  lack  detailed,  time-consistent  inter-provincial  price  data,  but  Nashihin  (2007) 
provides  the most comprehensive set of estimates.
12 We use these estimates to 
adjust the three series for 2004 (see Table 3). As would be expected, the richer and 
more remote provinces also have higher living costs. Thus Jakarta’s relative income 
falls  significantly,  from  4.2  times  the  national  average  GRP/capita  to  3.4.  East 
Kalimantan falls from 4.6 to 4.2 (Central Kalimantan also falls substantially), while in 
Papua it is from 1.23 to 1.06. Elsewhere, the effects are mixed and not significant. 
The relative incomes of Central and East Java and Yogyakarta rise somewhat, while 
some poor, remote provinces such as Maluku become even poorer. We also include 
regional GRP deflators for each province over this period. These show that prices 
have  risen  more  rapidly  in  Jakarta  than  any  other  province,  hence  inflating  its 
relative income in the current price series. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Thus,  on  balance,  income  differentials  narrow,  but  only  slightly,  except  for  the 
special case of Jakarta. It is important to note in any case that the price data are 
necessarily approximate. Moreover, they refer only to prices in provincial capitals. 
Especially in the remote, sparsely population regions off-Java, there are likely to be 
large intra-provincial price differences. 
 
 
(3) Regional Economic Growth and Structural Change 
 
(3.1) Patterns of Regional Economic Growth 
 
We now examine provincial economic growth rates over the same periods and for 
the same series. Since population growth rates vary considerably (see below), we 
calculate both total and per capita growth rates. 
 
First, the total growth rates (Table 4b). Indonesian GDP grew at an annual average 
growth of 5.6%, 1975-2004. Java-Bali, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi grew faster than 
the national average, which was pulled down by Sumatra. Eastern Indonesia grew at 
the same rate as the national average. However, the Sumatran figure is depressed 
by the special case of Riau. In the non-mining series, the national average growth 
rate was 6.4%, and so too (very nearly) was that of Sumatra, Java and Sulawesi. 
Kalimantan grew slightly faster and Eastern Indonesia a bit slower. The growth rates 
for household expenditure were also fairly similar. 
 
        (Table 4b about here) 
 
Population growth has generally been higher in the richer and ‘frontier’ regions (see 
below, Table 6). On a per capita basis, Java-Bali was the fastest growing region, 
followed  by  Sulawesi  (Table  4a).  Here  too  Sumatra  was  pulled  down  by  the  oil 
sector.  In  the  case  of  growth  in  non-mining  GRP  per  capita,  there  is  the  same 
relatively even growth pattern across island groupings: Java-Bali was the only major 
                                                
12 The first systematic set of estimates was prepared by Arndt and Sundrum (1975), 
but these are not comparable with the Nashihin (2007) estimates, and therefore we 
are restricted to the 2004 adjustments.   Page 11 of 29 
region  to  grow  (slightly)  faster  than  the  national  figure  of  4.6%.  Kalimantan  and 
Sulawesi  were  just  below  it,  followed  by  Sumatra,  and  Eastern  Indonesia  0.9 
percentage points below the average. The growth rates of household expenditure 
are similarly quite even. 
 
        (Table 4a about here)  
 
It is not easy to identify obvious groupings and characteristics of provinces based on 
growth rates. The fastest growth rates (in GRP per capita) over the period 1975-
2004 occurred in Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, West Sumatra, Jakarta, Central Java, 
and  North  Sulawesi.  The  slowest  rates  were  recorded  in  Riau,  Papua,  South 
Sumatra, Maluku, East Kalimantan and Jambi. Thus the fast growers included both 
small and large provinces, ‘central’ and remote locations, and initially high and low 
per  capita  incomes.  The  only  common  element  appears  to  be  the  absence of a 
major resource sector, whereas this is a feature of all but one of the slow growers. 
 
For  a  more  detailed  examination,  we  focus  on  the  non-mining  per  capita  series, 
which is arguably the most accurate indicator of provincial economic performance. 
The  fastest  growing  provincial  economy  by  a  significant  margin  (1.1  percentage 
point over number 2) has been Bali. Also in the high-growth group (at least 5%) are 
Southeast Sulawesi,
13 Jakarta and West Sumatra. A further four provinces are just 
above the average: North Sumatra, West and Central Java, and North Sulawesi. 
 
Conversely, a number of provinces have grown at a rate at least a percentage point 
slower than the national average.  These are Papua and Maluku in the east, and 
Riau, Jambi and South Sumatra in Sumatra. The remaining 13 provinces grew close 
to but slower than the national average. 
 
The  story  differs  for  the  shorter  (and  not  directly  comparable)  PCE  series.  The 
fastest growing provinces from 1983 to 2004 were East Java, North Sulawesi, East 
Nusa Tenggara, West Sumatra and Central Java. The slowest growth was recorded 
in Yogyakarta, Southeast Sulawesi, Riau, Bali and Bengkulu. 
 
The story also differs by sub-periods. Aceh grew very fast over the period 1975-90 
as  its  gas  production  came  on  stream,  but  very  slowly  since  1990  in  an  era  of 
(mostly) lower energy prices and as conflict increasingly affected economic activity. 
Similarly, East Kalimantan slowed down in the second period of lower energy prices 
and slower timber exploitation. In fact, Kalimantan experienced the greatest growth 
deceleration  among  the  major  island  groupings,  mainly  owing  to  these  factors, 
principally the former. Bali also slowed down from its exceptionally rapid growth, but 
was still above average after 1990. 
 
By contrast, some provinces which grew slower than the national average in the first 
period recorded above average rates in the second. This appears to be especially 
the  case  for  a  number  of  export-oriented  economies,  which  benefitted  from  the 
                                                
13  The  very  high  growth  rates  of  small  provinces  like  Southeast  Sulawesi  in  the 
earlier period need to be interpreted with great caution. The statistical infrastructure 
was still rudimentary, and the transition from subsistence to a monetary economy 
may have inflated measured growth rates. The regional accounts for Papua were 
similarly very approximate.   Page 12 of 29 
1980s reforms and which weathered the economic crisis better than other regions. 
Examples include the predominantly agricultural producers, North, West and South 
Sumatra (the latter the only province to actually grow faster in the second period as 
compared  to  the  first),  Lampung,  all  of  Sulawesi  except  the  Southeast,  and  the 
industrial province of West Java. 
 
Although  in  aggregate  growing  more  slowly  than  the  national  average,  the  four 
Eastern  provinces  experienced  mixed  fortunes.  Maluku  as  noted  was  severely 
affected  by the post-crisis conflict. East Nusa Tenggara grew a percentage point 
faster than the national average in the second period, and the West at about the 
average. Papua’s growth was dependent on commodity prices, but its household 
expenditure grew at almost the national rate. 
 
There are several cases of provinces growing faster than the national average but 
slipping in the relative income rankings. For example, North Sulawesi grew faster 
than  the  Indonesian  (non-mining)  average  1975-2004,  but  its  relative  GRP  per 
capita fell very sharply, from 109 to 60. East Nusa Tenggara grew at the national 
average, but its income fell from 52% of the national average to just 33%. There are 
also converse cases, such as Riau, where non-oil per capita growth was less than 
half the national average, but its relative income rose. These are presumably the 
result of local terms of trade effects, that is of local economies specializing in the 
production of goods and services whose prices have risen faster or slower than the 
general price level (or specifically the national accounts deflator). This is confirmed 
for example in the case of North Sulawesi: using constant rather than current prices, 
its per capita income ranking rises considerably. It is also apparent from the regional 
deflators in Table 3: Maluku and North Sulawesi have the country’s lowest figures. 
 
There  are  no  obvious  correlates  among  the  fast  growers.  Just  two  (Jakarta  and 
North Sumatra) had above average incomes in 1975. The explanations for Jakarta 
and Bali are relatively straightforward – the seat of government, global connections 
and high value services and industry in the former, and the tourism success story 
and  resultant  spillovers  in  the  latter.  In  West  and  Central  Java,  export-oriented 
industrialization,  especially  in  West  Java  from  the  mid  1980s,  and  the  earlier 
agricultural successes, especially in Central Java, were important. North Sumatra 
has a strong agricultural base, and was traditionally the most industrialized province 
outside Java. 
 
West Sumatra and North Sulawesi had traditionally strong agricultural bases and 
quite good education records. But both are somewhat distant from the main centres 
of  commerce,  and  neither  has  had  a  ‘booming  sector’.  West  Sumatra’s  service 
sector growth is probably connected to high levels of inward remittances, as a result 
of  its  long  history  of  mainly  male  out-migration  (merantau).  In  the  case  of  North 
Sulawesi, tourism, shipping, and agro processing (mainly based on coconuts and 
fisheries) have all done quite well. More recently, its tolerance of diverse religions 
and ethnicities has reportedly attracted investment from neighbouring conflict-prone 
regions.
14 
                                                
14 For an economic survey of the province since the crisis, see Sondakh and Jones 
(2003), which extends their earlier work on this province, in Hill (ed, 1989). Note that 
it,  too,  has  been  subject  to  boundary  changes,  following  the  establishment  of 
Gorontalo as a separate province.   Page 13 of 29 
 
Are these regional growth differences amenable to quantitative explanation? There 
is a large literature attempting to explain international differences in growth rates, but 
much less on inter-regional differences. Can one draw on the former to help explain 
the  latter?  Within  a  country,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  something  approaching 
perfect factor mobility and homogeneous nation-wide institutions. Moreover, regions 
within a country have the same macroeconomic environment and trade regime, and 
generally operate within the same institutional context (a common legal system, etc). 
Hence the answer is presumably no. Conversely, as a growing literature has argued, 
the growth literature can be productively employed, in a modified form.
15 That is, 
openness can be redefined to mean ‘connected’ (to the global economy); institutions 
clearly do differ among regions in many countries; and factor and product markets in 
developing countries are often poorly integrated. 
   
The  international  evidence  suggests,  first,  that  regions  which  are  the  most 
connected to the global economy (ie, in the sense of location, infrastructure and 
trade regime) are likely to grow more quickly, as in the case of coastal China and 
Penang in Malaysia. This seems to fit the story for Jakarta, Bali and in recent times 
Riau (at least the islands adjacent to Singapore). These are arguably the regions 
most connected to the global economy, in terms of facilitating physical infrastructure, 
trade in goods and services and the movement of people. It is significant that they 
have all grown quickly as Indonesia has become more open. 
 
A  second  factor  is  clustering  and  increasing  returns  to  scale,  as  forward  and 
backward linkages develop and spill over from growth centres. The best example in 
the  Indonesian  context  is  probably  the  rapid  industrialization  in  West  Java  since 
1980 around the periphery of Jakarta. This region has now become the industrial 
heartland of Indonesia. 
 
The evidence on regional institutions and governance is mixed and incomplete. We 
lack  reliable  long  term  estimates  of  any  ‘quality’  variables,  and  in  any  case  the 
provinces have enjoyed significant political authority only since the decentralization 
of 2001, while local-level democracy has arrived even more recently. There is some 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that the higher growth regions have been quite well 
governed.  Fox  et  al  (1992)  argued  that  East  Java’s  rapid  and  balanced 
development, and the quality of provincial governance was a factor. Government 
programs have generally been effective in Bali, while concerted inter-faith leadership 
in North Sulawesi has resulted in that religiously mixed province being largely free of 
communal tensions. 
 
The  indifferent  record  of  the  resource  rich  provinces  is  suggestive  of  a  Sachs-
Warner (2001) ‘resource curse’ at work. Two of the four provinces have experienced 
very serious conflict, and most of the resource wealth (at least until 2001) accrued to 
entities outside the province. However, there is sufficient diversity within this group 
to caution against sweeping generalizations. Two of the provinces, East Kalimantan 
and Riau, have become increasingly prosperous. 
 
 
(3.2) Growth and Structural Change 
                                                
15 See for example Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991) and Rey and Montouri (1999).   Page 14 of 29 
 
Indonesia was a predominantly agrarian economy in the mid 1970s. Reflecting this, 
agriculture was more than one-third of GRP in 21 out of the 26 provinces in 1975. In 
10 it was at least half (Table 5). By 2004, only eight were above this threshold. Thus, 
consistent  with  the well-known hypothesis linking  economic growth and structural 
change,  there  has  been  a rapid shift out  of agriculture. The provinces that  have 
been  slow  to  make  this  transition  are  either  among  the  poorest  in  the  country 
(Maluku,  Southeast  and  Central  Sulawesi,  East  Nusa  Tenggara),  or  have  a  very 
strong  comparative  advantage  in  agriculture  (Central  Kalimantan,  Jambi)  or  a 
combination of both (Lampung, Bengkulu). 
 
        (Table 5 about here) 
 
Industrialization is the flip side of the coin: no province had a share of manufacturing 
in  GRP  in  excess  of  20%  in  1975.  By  2004,  seven  provinces  registered  shares 
greater than 20%: the three big Java provinces dominated, particularly West Java 
with  43%.  Off  Java,  the  higher  shares  are  found  in  Riau,  owing  principally  to 
Singapore  industrial  spillover,  the  two  Sumatran  provinces  with  large 
agricultural/industrial  processing  sectors  (North  and  South  Sumatra),  and  East 
Kalimantan with its timber processing and oil-related fertilizer and heavy industries. 
There has been only one significant case of ‘deindustrialization’, in Jakarta, where 
the manufacturing share is little over half the 1985 figure as factories have migrated 
across the border to West Java/Banten.  
 
There has also been a general increase in the services sector share. In 1975 there 
were just two provinces in which services contributed at least one-half of GRP. By 
2004, five provinces were  in this group, and several more were close to it. Only 
resource-rich  Riau,  Papua  and  East  Kalimantan  recorded  a  share  below  25%  of 
GDP. Interestingly, high and/or increased service sector shares have occurred in a 
variety of development contexts. Land-scarce Jakarta has always had the highest 
service sector share, as the seat of national government, the provider of high value 
commercial services, and the national transport and communication hub. There are 
high shares in Bali and Yogyakarta, reflecting their status as leading tourism and 
education centres respectively. The share is also high in West Sumatra, reflecting 
the traditional importance of remittances. But the share is also high in poorer and/or 
more remote regions, including Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara and North Sulawesi. 
For  the  poorer  regions,  the  explanation  has  more  to  do  with  a  relatively  large 
government sector, as fiscal transfers have been weighted in their favour. Higher 
transport shares in remote regions is also a factor.  
 
Theory also predicts that there is a positive association between economic growth 
and the speed of structural change. We test this by calculating a simple index of 
structural change between the A, I, and S sectors for each province. The estimates 
for structural change are presented in Tables 5a and 5b for total and non-mining 
GRP respectively. The index is calculated both at the 3-sector and 9-sector national 
accounts classification, and the results (in the final two columns of the tables) are 
generally not sensitive to the level of disaggregation. 
 
A simple plot of growth and the relevant index is presented in Figure 1 (a and b). 
There appears to be quite a weak correlation between growth and structural change. 
In  the  case  of  non-mining  GRP  (Figure  1b),  the  fastest  structural  change  has   Page 15 of 29 
occurred in a diverse group of provinces: East Kalimantan (reflecting the resource 
boom and spillovers), West Java (rising industrialization), Riau (resource boom plus 
Singapore-related  industrialization),  Maluku,  Bali  (tourism  growth),  and  the  Nusa 
Tenggaras. Structural change has been relatively slow in many of the agricultural 
provinces of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, reflecting the slow movement out 
of this sector in many of them. It is surprisingly low in Jakarta, presumably because 
the  classification  is  too  aggregated  to  pick  up  many  of  the  new  service  sector 
activities.  The  correlation  between  growth  and  structural  change  is  somewhat 
stronger if mining is included (Figure 1a). 
 
 
        (Figure 1 about here) 
 
 
(3.3) Demographic Dynamics 
 
Finally,  how  closely  do  Indonesia’s  regional  demographics  correlate  with  these 
economic changes?
16 The country’s demographics reflect the interplay of four main 
factors: highly uneven ‘initial conditions’ (in the patterns of spatial settlements); the 
uneven  location  of  opportunities  for  employment,  economic  advancement  and 
education,  which  in  turn  triggers  migration;  official  migration  policy  (a  factor 
especially  in  the  period  1970-85);  and  the  speed  of  the  demographic  transition 
towards low fertility and mortality. Table 6 highlights these patterns over the period 
1971-2000.
17  First,  the  population  is  heavily  concentrated  on  Java-Bali,  though 
becoming less so, especially outside Jakarta-West Java. Sumatra and Kalimantan 
have been gaining most of the declining Java-Bali population share, while that of 
Sulawesi  and  Eastern  Indonesia  (excluding  Papua)  has  been  constant  over  the 
three decades. 
 
        (Table 6 about here)  
 
Provincial population growth is a combination of natural increase and net migration. 
There  is  no  recent  decomposition  of  these  two  elements  available  (see  the 
references  in  footnote  16  for  earlier  estimates),  and  thus  low  population  growth 
could be the result of either a very fast decline in fertility, continuing high mortality or 
outmigration. These factors have very different economic/demographic implications. 
However, the percentage of the population born outside the province (see Table 10) 
gives a reasonably accurate indication of the extent of in-migration. 
 
The major magnets are predictably those provinces that offer opportunities for socio-
economic advancement. Thus they tend to be the richer ones or the frontier regions. 
Jakarta is quintessentially a migrant city, as it always has been (Castles, 1989), with 
by  far  the  highest  proportion.  There  are  also  very  high  shares  in  resource-
rich/frontier East and Central Kalimantan, almost all of southern Sumatra (proximity 
to  Java  and  employment  opportunities),  Central  and  Southeast  Sulawesi,  and 
                                                
16  For  analyses  of  Indonesian  regional  demographics,  see  Hugo,  Hull,  Hull  and 
Jones (1987), Jones and Hull (eds, 1997), Muhidin (2002). 
17 That is, independent Indonesia’s second and fifth decennial population censuses.   Page 16 of 29 
Papua.




(4) Regional Inequality and Convergence 
 
(4.1) An Overview 
 
We extend this analysis with reference to the ‘four-quadrant’ story relating initial (ie, 
1975) levels of per capita GRP and per capita growth over the period 1975-2004 
(Figure  2a).  In  1975,  only  four  provinces  had  above  average  income  –  East 
Kalimantan, Jakarta, Papua and Riau. Subsequently, only Jakarta grew at above the 
national  average.  Conversely,  of  the  22  provinces  with below average  income in 
1975, only four – Jambi, South Sumatra and Maluku – grew at a slower rate than the 
national  average.  Thus,  most  provinces  were  in  either  the  ‘above  average 
growth/below  average  income’  category,  or  the  converse,  suggesting  that  inter-
provincial inequality was declining over this period. Many were in fact very close to 
the  national  average  growth  rate.  We  shortly  test  this  formally  with  reference  to 
convergence estimates. 
 
        (Figure 2a about here) 
 
When  mining  is  excluded,  the  story  changes  somewhat  (Figure  2b).  Two  of  the 
seven provinces with above average non-mining GRP in 1975 also registered above 
average growth 1975-2004. These were Jakarta and East Kalimantan. Reassuringly 
from the point of view of inter-regional equity, although there are five provinces in 
the below average income/slow growth quadrant for the non-mining GRP series, all 
but one is close to one or other of the national averages. The one exception is the 
special and recent case of Maluku. In the case of the expenditure series (Figure 2c), 
six provinces are in the bottom left quadrant, that is, poor and apparently slipping 
behind:  Bengkulu,  Yogyakarta,  West  Kalimantan,  Maluku,  Central  Sulawesi  and 
Southeast Sulawesi. Here too most of these are very close to one or other national 
average. The latter three are furthest inside the quadrant, and therefore regions of 
concern from the point of view of regional equity. 
 




We now examine the evidence on inequality and convergence, with reference to the 
two usual measures, absolute b convergence, that is whether poorer provinces are 
catching up to richer ones, and s convergence, an overall measure of inequality. 
Furthermore, there are two types of b convergence, absolute and conditional. The 
former  refers  to  the  absence  of  any  of  the  control  variables  presumed  likely  to 
                                                
18 The special case of Lampung deserves note. It was traditionally designated as a 
major  transmigrant-recipient  region,  and  in  1971  had  by  far the highest  share  of 
migrants  outside  Jakarta  (Bakir  and  Humaidi, 1989). However, its slower growth, 
combined with the emergence of other more attractive destinations and the lower 
cost of movement, meant that by 2000 it had slipped to seventh ranking in terms of 
the proportion born outside the province.    Page 17 of 29 
influence convergence. In this paper we focus just on this concept, since an analysis 
of conditional convergence entails a much larger and more complex exercise. 
 
Here  too  we  examine  the  evidence  for  the  three  series.  We  also  compare  the 
Indonesian  data  with  international  evidence.  Note  that,  owing  to  differences  in 
economic welfare concepts and the number of regional administrative units, the data 
are not strictly comparable across countries. However, they provide a reasonably 
accurate picture of trends.  
 
As noted, growth theory predicts that absolute convergence is more likely to apply 
across regions than among countries, principally because there are fewer barriers to 
mobility in the former, and less variation in policies and institutions. However, much 
depends  on  centre-region  policies,  particularly  concerning  fiscal  arrangements 
(Sala-I-Martin, 1996). 
 
Formally, b convergence is the partial correlation between income growth and its 
initial value in the standard Solow-Swan growth model. That is, 
ln yt–ln y*  = e
-bt  ln y0 – e
-bt ln y* = e
-bt  (ln y0 –ln y*)….  
Where: 
yt   = the income per capita at time t,   
y0   = the initial income per capita(at time 0) and  
y*  = the steady state income per capita 
 
 
The growth trajectory is estimated in its reduced form as: 
ln (yt / y0)/t= α + (e
b –1) ln y0+ ut. … 
 
The second concept, s convergence, employs a measure of standard deviation. A 
lower value simply indicates a smaller variation in inter-regional income. The most 
common measure, widely used in growth economics, is the variance of the log value 










) ln (ln s   
where:   
i y = income per capita in region i 
  y = average income per capita 
n = number of regions. 
 
 
Alternative measures include the coefficient of variation (popularized in the regional 
economics literature by Williamson, 1965) and the Thiel index of inequality. In this 
paper, following Williamson, we employ coefficients of variation.
19 
 
It  should  be  noted  that  b  convergence  is  a  necessary  not  sufficient  condition  to 
achieve  s  convergence.  That  is,  poorer  regions  catching  up  to  richer  ones  is 
necessary  for  aggregate  inequality  to  decline.  But  catch-up  does  not  guarantee 
                                                
19 The series generally display a similar trend. For analyses of Indonesian inequality 
employing these measures, see for example Akita and Lukman (1995).    Page 18 of 29 
reduced inequality. For example, the catch-up process may involve the once poorer 
provinces overtaking the formerly richer ones; if the margin between them remains 
the  same,  b  convergence  has  occurred  but  there  is  no  s  convergence.  The 
development  of  China’s  coastal  provinces  over  the  past  quarter  century  is  an 
approximate illustration of such a phenomenon. 
 
(4.3) The Indonesian Evidence 
 
We  report  here  estimates  of  provincial  growth  rates  relative  to  initial  (ie,  1975) 
incomes,  that  is,  whether  absolute  b  convergence  is  present  (Table  7).  These 
extend  the  first  estimates  for  Indonesia  by  Garcia  Garcia  and  Soelistianingsih 
(1998), who found both absolute and conditional convergence of provincial GRP for 
the period 1983-93.  For GRP per capita, we find a  b coefficient of 1.5% for the 
period since 1975, suggesting that the observed disparity would halve over 46 years. 
The results are statistically very significant.  
 
        (Table 7 about here) 
  
However, these findings are sensitive to the period of analysis, as they are heavily 
influenced by the very high incomes in the resource-rich provinces in 1975, and the 
declining  relativities  since  as  the  oil/gas  sector  has  become  less  important.  For 
example,  for  the  years  1975-81,  coinciding  with  the  oil  boom,  the  absolute  b 
convergence was higher still (2.0%) and significant at 5%. In fact, excluding mining, 
the absolute b convergence for the whole period falls to 0.4% and it is insignificant. 
In the case of household consumption, available only since 1983, the coefficient is 
also low, 0.2%, and statistically insignificant.   
 
The pace of b convergence varies significantly across development periods. It was 
quite rapid (2%) during the oil boom, 1975-81, with the coefficient significant at 5%. 
This is to be expected, with the oil-rich provinces such as Riau and East Kalimantan 
having  high  initial  incomes  but  slower  growth  over  the  period.  Moreover,  central 
government grants to the regions, mainly the SDO and Inpres, became increasingly 
important towards the end of this period. 
 
The process of convergence accelerated still further in the wake of the oil boom, 
with  a  coefficient  of  2.8%  for  1981-86,  reflecting  the  impact  of  the  major  policy 
reforms.  It  was  also  positive,  though  slower,  for  the  other  series.  As  the  export-
oriented reforms took hold, the speed of convergence slowed, to 1.7% for the period 
1986-92, and further still during the 1990s, to just 1%. During the crisis period, no 
significant convergence occurred. This may appear surprising, given the widely held 
presumption that this event particularly affected the country’s richer regions, such as 
Jakarta. However, it needs to be remembered that some poorer regions were very 
badly affected by post-crisis conflicts (eg, Maluku), and that some strong agricultural 
exporters off-Java capitalized on the sharp exchange rate depreciation. 
 
For s convergence, measured as coefficients of variation, the estimates are similarly 
highly sensitive to whether the mining sector is included (Figure 3).  With mining, 
inequality  is  high  and  variable  during  the  oil  boom  period.  It  then  declines 
significantly,  and  more  or  less  continuously,  through  until  the  crisis  period,  after 
which  it  slightly  increases  again.  The  coefficients  for  the  non-mining  GRP  and 
household expenditure series are initially much lower, less than half the value of the   Page 19 of 29 
GRP series. They remain fairly stable during the 1980s reform period, but both begin 
to increase  after  the crisis, again only slightly.
20 By  2004,  reflecting the declining 
share of the mining sector, the two GRP series had almost converged. 
 
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
Additional insights are obtained by decomposing the variations in provincial income 
by sector. The results of this analysis are not shown here, but the broad summary is 
as follows. Overall, and as would be expected, regional inequality in agricultural and 
services output is much lower than that of mining and manufacturing. Mining is of 
course  the  highest,  owing  to  the  uneven  spatial  distribution  of  major  mineral 
deposits.  The  inequality  for  the  aggregated  industrial  sector  (ie,  mining, 
manufacturing, construction and utilities) has therefore always been high, though it 
has  been  falling  for  most  of  the  period,  reflecting  mainly  the  declining  share  of 
mining since the late 1970s. Regional inequality in agricultural output has risen for 
most  of  the  period,  but  this  sector’s  share  of  GDP  has  fallen  rapidly,  hence  the 
increase has had little overall impact. By contrast, inequality in services has been 




(4.4) Indonesia in International Perspective 
 
Table  8  shows  Indonesia’s  absolute  b  convergence  estimates  in  comparative 
perspective. Sala-I-Martin (1996) argued on the basis of several OECD countries 
that most developed countries experience absolute regional convergence, with an 
absolute  b  convergence  of  up  to  2%.  This  is  similar  to  Indonesia’s  with-mining 




        (Table 8 about here) 
 
The Chinese record is summarized by Song (2007).
23 The central planning period 
led to egalitarian development, with large SOE investments in some inland regions. 
Institutional  barriers  to  mobility,  particularly  the  household  registration  system 
(hukao), were high. The reforms from the late 1970s had profound implications for 
regional  development  patterns.  Resources  were  progressively  transferred  to 
                                                
20  The  small  increase  in  inequality  since  the  crisis  appears  to  be  due  mainly  to 
regional differences in inflation. The constant price series show very little change, 
whereas the current price series increases slightly. 
21 As the regional data base has expanded, it has also become possible to calculate 
regional inequality among second tier regions. For example, Akita and Alisjahbana 
(2002)  decomposed  Indonesian  inequality  into  within-province,  between-province 
and  between-region  over  the  period  1993-98.  (The  regions  are  the  main  island 
groupings,  that  is  Java-Bali,  Sumatra,  Kalimantan,  Sulawesi  and  other  Eastern 
Indonesia.) They found the former to be the largest source of inequality in 1997 
(50%  of  the  total),  while  between-province  inequality  accounted  for  most  of  the 
remainder (43%).  
22 See Shankar and Shah (2003) for a comprehensive summary through to around 
2000. 
23 See also Garnaut, Song and Zhao (eds, 2007).   Page 20 of 29 
provincial  governments.  The  rapidly  rising  private  sector  investment  located  in 
profitable locations, mostly on the eastern seaboard, propelled also by favourable 
trade and fiscal concessions in the export zones. Barriers to mobility were gradually 
relaxed. Infrastructure in the more remote western region lagged. As a result, rural-
urban and inter-regional inequality rose. There appears to  have been  absolute b 
convergence over the period 1978-92, particularly in the early years; estimates of 
the  coefficient  range  from  1.7%  to  2.5%  (Jian,  Warner  and  Sachs,  1996).  Most 
estimates suggest rising absolute b divergence from around 1990.  
 
In the Philippines, Balisacan (2007) and Balisacan and Fuwa (2004) found evidence 
of absolute b convergence among 73 provinces over the period 1988-2003, at a rate 
of 2.2%. This is higher than the estimate of Manasan and Chatterjee (2003) for the 
period 1987-2000, of 0.7%. The latter’s analysis pertains to the aggregated regions 
(16 in total then), which are quite diverse in terms of socio-economic characteristics; 
they also use GRP rather than household income data. Balisacan  (2007) also finds 
a wide dispersion of means around the fitted line, suggesting that there are factors 
other than initial income that influence long-term provincial income growth. He then 
introduces  a  range  of  growth  conditioning  variables,  finding  that  infrastructure, 




In the case of India, Cashin and Sahay (1996) found absolute b divergence rather 
than  convergence  for  most  of  the  post-independence  period.  Ahluwalia  (2002) 
reaches a similar conclusion. He also notes the importance of migration, and the 
associated rise in remittances, in ameliorating inter-regional inequality, while  also 
observing various barriers to inter-state mobility. 
 
The Latin American literature concludes there are generally high levels of regional 
inequality,  and  mixed  evidence  on  convergence.  For  six  large,  middle-income 
countries,
24  Serra  et  al  (2006)  concluded  that  there  was  a  very  slow  rate  of 
convergence between rich and poor regions since around 1970. Chile experienced 
the fastest rate of convergence (but still a slow 1.2%). In Argentina and Mexico there 
was  no  convergence.  There  was  some  evidence  of  regional  ‘convergence  clubs’ 
within  Brazil  and  Peru.  Interestingly,  regional  inequality  increased,  at  least 
temporarily, after countries pursued trade liberalization. Mexican regional inequality 
is  among  the  highest  in  the  world,  and  has  been  largely  unaffected  by  various 
regional development programs. A major development dynamic has been the growth 
of economic activity adjacent to the US border, particularly since the signing of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (Giugale and Webb, eds, 2000). 
 
 
(4.5) Social Correlates 
 
Finally, how do economic and social indicators correlate, both across provinces and 
over time?
25 Table 9 provides a summary picture. We include here a health indicator 
(infant  mortality),  an  education  indicator  (average  years  of  schooling),  and  the 
                                                
24 Namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
25 For studies of Indonesian social outcomes at the regional level, see Ananta (ed, 
2003), Balisacan, Pernia and Asra (2003), and UNDP (2004).   Page 21 of 29 
percentage of the population below the poverty line. The first two are based on the 
Population Censuses of 1971 and 2000, while the poverty estimates are available 
only from 1984. 
 
        (Table 9 about here) 
 
Two general points deserve emphasis. First, there are dramatic improvements in the 
social indicators: by 2000, infant mortality was just a third of the 1971 rate, while 
average  years  of  schooling  had  risen  almost  three-fold.  Moreover,  these 
improvements have been experienced practically throughout the country. Although 
the rankings have not changed significantly, in all but one case infant mortality rates 
have at least halved, and years of schooling have doubled. The one exception is 
Papua, for which the early data series are incomplete. For the shorter time series of 
the poverty estimates, also,  there is broad-based decline.  Here too, Papua  goes 
against the trend, partly owing to data weaknesses, but also reflecting the unequal 
nature of its development referred to above. Aceh is the only other province where 
poverty has increased, owing to the effects of the prolonged conflict. 
 
Second, coefficients of variation are low, but there is no clear trend in them. The 
health and education CV’s are very low, well below that of the regional accounts 
series. They reflect the fact that, as with inter-country comparisons, inter-provincial 
social inequalities are lower than economic inequality. The poverty CV is higher, to 
be  expected  since  it  is  generated  from  the  consumption  expenditure  estimates. 
There is a slight increase in the poverty and health CV’s, while for education they 
fall. These trends are to be expected, and indicate in particular the government’s 
emphasis  on  universal  mass  primary  and  lower  secondary  education  since  the 
1970s. 
 
There  are  now  several  estimates  of  Human  Development  Indices  for  Indonesian 
provinces.  They  are  not  presented  here,  but  they  show  the  expected  positive 
relationship  between  non-mining  GRP  per  capita  and  HDI,  albeit  with  much 
clustering  close  to  the  averages.  Jakarta  stands  out  with  the  highest  on  both 
measures, while the Nusa Tenggaras and Papua are among the lowest. There are 
several provinces with below average income per capita but above average HDI. 
The  two  major  cases  are  North  Sulawesi  and  Yogyakarta,  both  with  traditionally 
strong education achievement. Interestingly, there are no cases of above average 
(non-mining)  GRP  per  capita  but  below  average  HDI.  This  suggests  that  the 
resource  rich  provinces  (with  the  possible  exceptions  of  Papua  and  Aceh  noted 
above) have been reasonably successful at translating the benefits of the resource 
booms into improved social indicators. One qualification that needs to be attached to 
these conclusions is that all the provincial HDI’s thus far prepared include an income 
or expenditure variable, typically with a weight of one-third, thus limiting their value 
as an independent check on economic and social correlates. 
 
 
(5) Vulnerability to Social Conflict 
 
Particularly since the fall of the Soeharto regime, several regions have experienced 
episodes  of  severe  social  conflict  (see  Coppel  (ed,  2006)).  The  most  serious 
incidents  have  occurred  in  Aceh,  Maluku  and  Papua.  Are  there  any  systematic   Page 22 of 29 




Measuring  conflict  –  its  nature,  intensity,  and  origins  –  is  of  course  extremely 
complex. The only reasonably comprehensive provincial data base on the subject is 
provided by BPS’s PODES (Potensi Desa, Village Potential) series. The data relate 
to 2003 and define conflict as beyond some threshold of violence, associated with 
loss of life, serious injury, or property damage. Data were collected at the village 
level, from the country’s 69,000 villages and urban communities. 
 
They  are  presented  in  the  final  column  of  Table  10.  There  are  well-known 
weaknesses with the data, which in any case relate to a specific and unusual period 
of Indonesian development. The survey does not appear to have collected data as 
thoroughly  as  some  of  the  in-depth  field  surveys,  and  there  are  probably  some 
region-specific reporting biases. The data reporting mechanism through the village 
head  probably  resulted  in  some  negative  statistics  being  filtered  out,  with  these 
official  not  surprisingly  wishing  to  play  down  evidence  of  a  failure  of  local 
administration. The survey reports high levels of violence in Aceh and Maluku, as 
expected. But there are some surprising results: above average figures for Jakarta 
and West and East Nusa Tenggara, and low figures for Papua. Nevertheless, they 
are  the  only  data  set  available,  and  they  are  at  least  indicative  of  the  extent  of 
conflict. 
 
        (Table 10 about here) 
 
We do not attempt a formal econometric estimation of the determinants of inter-
provincial variations in conflict. But as an indicative exercise, we present estimates 
of a number of variables hypothesized to be likely explanators. A number of these 
are inter-related, and therefore any quantitative approach would need to deal with 
the problem of multicollinearity. 
 
The first indicator is the volatility of provincial growth rates, defined as the coefficient 
of  variation  (CV).  Its  inclusion  is  based  on  the  premise  that  higher  variations  in 
growth rates will lead to increased insecurity and therefore possibly conflict. These 
are  shown  in  columns  1-3  for  each  of  the  indicators  used  above.  As  would  be 
expected, the resource-rich regions experience higher growth volatility, with the CVs 
of  Aceh,  Riau,  East  Kalimantan,  Maluku  and  Papua  at  least  double  the  national 
average, and Papua four times. The high figures for Aceh and Papua lend prima 
facie support to the hypothesis.  
 
However, it is not obvious that there is a clear determining pattern here, for several 
reasons. First, the household expenditure data are arguably a much better indicator 
of  fluctuations  in  economic  welfare,  and  the  volatility  in  this  variable  is  generally 
lower. Nor are the more volatile growth rates found just in these four cases. In fact, 
the most volatile household expenditure patterns are Maluku, North Sulawesi and 
Central Kalimantan. 
 
Second, the direction of causality is also unclear. For example, Maluku was peaceful 
and experienced fairly stable growth patterns until the onset of serious conflict in 
1998. In other words, this was a case of conflict causing the growth volatility, rather   Page 23 of 29 
than  the  converse.  A  similar  observation  applies  to  some  extent  in  the  case  of 
Central Kalimantan. 
 
Third,  there  are  cases  of  both  high  growth  volatility  and  low  conflict,  and  the 
converse. North Sulawesi has the highest CV for household expenditure, and it is 
religiously  mixed,  but  it  has  experienced  little  conflict.  Jakarta,  West  Java  and 
Yogyakarta are also above average but largely peaceful.  
 
The second indicator is the share of natural resources in provincial GRP (see above, 
Table 4). This is a sub-national variant of the ‘natural resource curse’, that a large 
natural resource sector will result in a more volatile income stream (that is, the first 
factor) and also possibly exacerbate conflict over the allocation of natural resource 
rents. In 2004, mining generated over one-third of provincial GRP in three of the 
resource-rich  provinces,  and  more  than  one  quarter  in  the  fourth,  Aceh.
26  High 
shares  are  also  evident  in  West  Nusa  Tenggara  (of  very  recent  origins),  South 
Sumatra and South Kalimantan. Severe and protracted conflict has occurred in two 
of  these  provinces,  Aceh  and  Papua,  again  lending  prima  facie  support  to  this 
hypothesis.  Nevertheless,  the  other  resource-rich  regions  have  been  relatively 
peaceful,  while  serious  conflict  has  occurred  where  mining  shares  are  low,  for 
example Maluku, Central Kalimantan and Southeast Sulawesi. Hence, the presence 
of mining enclaves per se is an insufficient explanation for conflict. 
 
A third variable relates to ethnic fragmentation, data for which we include on the 
grounds that greater ethnic diversity is alleged by some to hinder the development of 
local cohesion and trust, and to heighten the potential for conflict.
27 We lack precise 
estimates of ethnic diversity at the provincial level in Indonesia, but a good proxy for 
it is religious belief, especially as the latter has been a source of tension in some of 
Indonesia’s most serious conflicts, such as Poso (Central Sulawesi) and Maluku. A 
convenient proxy for religious diversity is the percentage share of the largest religion 




There does not appear to be a clear relationship between the incidence of conflict 
and religious diversity. There are cases of an apparently strong association, such as 
Maluku,  East  Nusa  Tenggara  and  to  some  extent  Jakarta.  Yet  there  are  more 
examples where the converse applies. Aceh has one of the highest majority-religion 
shares but serious conflict.  North Sulawesi is at the opposite end of the spectrum, 
with the highest religious diversity but little conflict.  North Sumatra and some of the 
Kalimantan provinces are religiously mixed but have low recorded conflict (but note 
                                                
26 The high share for mining in West Nusa Tenggara is of recent origins, and dates 
from the establishment of the sometimes controversial Newmont copper and gold 
mine on Sumbawa. The share of mining in the province’s GRP rose from 4% in 1999 
to 28% in 2000. 
27 See for example Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999). 
28 We choose this variable rather than simply the share of the Moslem population 
since there are four provinces in which adherents to Islam are in the minority – North 
Sulawesi,  East  Nusa  Tenggara,  Papua  (all  majority  Christian),  and  Bali  (majority 
Hindu). But in Bali especially there is little religious diversity, and thus the Moslem 
share would be a misleading indicator of religious diversity.    Page 24 of 29 
caveats).  There  are  also  instances  of  little  religious  diversity  but  considerable 
conflict, such as West Nusa Tenggara. 
 
Papua  is  a  special  case  in  this  context.  There  are  two  main  sources  of  spatial 
inequality, which together explain the perception that the benefits of growth have 
been enjoyed primarily by immigrant communities. The first is the urban-rural divide. 
Much of this was fuelled by the growth of the provincial capital, Jayapura, the centre 
of  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  mainly  non-Papuan  civil  service  and  major 
development  projects.  These  growing  centres  also  attracted  many  migrants  from 
other provinces in search of business opportunities. Poverty in the urban areas in 
2004 is quite low, around 8% in 2004. By contrast, in rural areas, where the majority 
of Papuans reside, poverty is still around 50%. The second major source is the huge 
Freeport mine, whose impact is mainly confined to Timika.  
 
Fourth,  the  percentage  of  the  population  born  outside  the  province  indicates  the 
extent  of  settler  arrivals.  It  too  is  suggestive  of  the  possibility  of  conflict,  as  in-
migrants compete for jobs and land access, and sometimes introduce customs at 
variance with local traditions (eg, concerning gender relations, diet, etc). Obviously, 
this variable is highly correlated with the share of the natural resource sector. As 
would be expected, a high migration presence is found in Jakarta, the resource-rich 
regions,  remote  ‘frontier’  regions,  and  areas  formerly  designated  by  the  central 
government as transmigration sites.  
 
Here too the evidence for this variable is mixed. There are examples where conflict 
and in-migration are significantly correlated, such as Papua, Southeast Sulawesi, 
Central  Kalimantan  and  Jakarta.  Yet,  there  are  also  cases  of  large  migrant 
communities generally living in harmony (eg, some of the Sumatran provinces and 
Yogyakarta); while some of the most serious conflict has occurred in regions with 
below-average in-migration, such as Aceh and Maluku. 
 
Finally,  it  might  be  expected  that  intra-provincial  inequality  in  income/expenditure 
would predispose a province to conflict. That is, cet par, high inequality provinces 
are more likely to experience conflict. We include estimates of provincial expenditure 
inequality  for  1984  (the  first  year  they  were  available)  and  2002 to examine this 
proposition.  Predictably,  above  average  inequality  is  found  in  the  resource-rich 
provinces, except Aceh. Papua particularly stands out. There is also high inequality 
in  the  two  most  urbanized  provinces  of  Java,  Jakarta  and  Yogyakarta.  With  the 
exception of Papua, all the high inequality provinces have been quite peaceful. By 
contrast, inequality is generally below average in areas of major conflict, such as 
Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Therefore, inequality per se does not appear to be a 
major explanatory factor. 
 
This  discussion  highlights  the  fact  that  the  magnitude  and  determinants  of  local 
conflict  are  complex,  interrelated  and  not  easily  amenable  to  quantitative 
explanation. The quality of local leadership is a key factor, and thought to be one of 
the reasons why one of the most religiously diverse provinces, North Sulawesi, has 
been largely free of conflict. In the case of Aceh, one of the most conflict-prone 
provinces, the conflict has been principally between the central government and the 
very  strong  local  identity  which,  when  mismanaged,  has  spawned  a  separatist 
movement.  It  required  a  terrible  natural  disaster  (the  December  2004  tsunami), 
presidential leadership, and a local capacity to negotiate to reach the 2005 peace   Page 25 of 29 
settlement. Similarly, the protracted conflict in Papua reflects its complex history and 






Our major conclusions include the following.  
 
First, there continues to be great diversity in economic and social outcomes, but 
growth  and  social  progress  have  been  remarkably  even.  There  has  been  no 
significant change in the concentration of economic activity across the major island 
groupings. As with all the economic variables, this conclusion is somewhat sensitive 
to whether or not the mining sector is included. Excluding mining, Java’s share has 
risen, mainly at the expense of Sumatra. 
 
More generally, economic activity has continued to cluster around some key regional 
economies. Java has remained dominant, and more broadly Java, Bali, Sumatra, 
and Kalimantan as compared to the Eastern region. (Although Sulawesi has gone 
from  below-average  to  above-average  growth  over  the  two  periods.)  Moreover, 
‘Greater  Jakarta’  has  assumed  ever  greater  prominence  in  the  nation’s  key 
economic agglomeration. 
 
Nevertheless,  the  poorest  regions,  mainly  located  in  Eastern  Indonesia,  have 
generally performed about as well as the national average. There is no case of a 
province with consistently poor performance for decades, in the sense of being well 
below  the  national  average  growth  rate,  let  alone  protracted  periods  of  negative 
growth. 
 
Second, as a corollary, regional disparities are either high and declining or moderate 
and stable, depending on which series is used. The former conclusion is based on 
the with-mining series. However, these provide a misleading indicator of local-level 
welfare, and therefore should be interpreted with caution. The other two series, that 
is non-mining GRP and personal consumption expenditure, suggest no significant 
change  in  inequality  or  catch-up  during  both  the  1980s  reforms  and  the  crisis 
periods. Over the entire period, there was no convergence in non-mining GRP per 
capita, while household expenditure has shown weak convergence.  
 
It is also notable that the policy reform period of 1984-96 produced a most even 
record of provincial economic performance, as compared to the mining boom and 
crisis/post-crisis  periods,  when major  exogenous events had uneven sub-national 
impacts.  
 
Third,  while  there  have  been  strong  performers  –  notably  Bali,  Jakarta,  and 
occasionally East Kalimantan and Riau – the group of top performers has been quite 
diverse,  as  to  location,  size  and  socio-economic  characteristics.    In  general,  the 
                                                
29 There is now an extensive literature on these regional conflicts. See for example 
McGibbon (2006) on Papua and Bouvier and Smith (2006) on Kalimantan 
For a detailed analysis of the origins and course of Southeast Asia’s most serious 
regional  conflict,  which  still  persists,  see  PHDR  (Philippine  Human  Development 
Report) 2005.   Page 26 of 29 
better performing regions are typically those that are the most ‘connected’ to the 
global economy. In this respect, Jakarta stands out as a special case, growing richer 
than the rest of the country over time.  
 
Although two of the strongest performers are resource-rich regions, there is no clear 
natural resource story, in that the performance of this group of provinces has varied 
considerably.  The  impact  of  enclave-style  development  has  also  varied  among 
them,  with  the  most  challenging  arguably  being  the  special  case  of  Papua. 
Moreover, it is evident that conflict is particularly harmful to economic development, 
as illustrated in the case of Maluku since 1997 and to a lesser extent Aceh.  
 
Future research in this area might focus on two areas. The first is an examination of 
the impact of decentralization on regional dynamics. This will need to be a longer-
term project since, as illustrated by the experience in the Philippines and elsewhere, 
it will arguably take at least a decade to discern impacts. Second, the fragmentation 
(pemekaran)  of  administrative  boundaries  is  greatly  complicating  longitudinal 
analysis.  This  paper  has  consolidated  the  current  34  provinces  back  to  26,  to 
facilitate comparisons over time. Even this process is a laborious one. It is currently 
not possible to draw inferences at the kabupaten level, the administrative unit to 
which  authority  and  resources  have  been  decentralized,  since  the  process  of 
boundary  changes  has  proceeded  much  further.  However,  it  may  be  possible  to 
develop  such  a  data  base  with  the  cooperation  of  Indonesia’s  Central  Board  of 
Statistics. With a finer level of disaggregation, it would be possible to examine the 
development  of  regional  clusters  in  more  detail,  since  these  invariably  straddle 
provincial  boundaries.  It  may  also  be  the  case  that  our  main  conclusions,  of  no 
major change in inter-regional inequality and no major ‘drop-outs’ (apart from Maluku 
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 Table 1. Shares of Provincial GRP, Non-mining GRP and Consumption Expenditure (in %)
1975 1990 2004 1975 1990 2004 1983 1990 2004
Aceh 1.6 3.8 2.2 1.7 2.8 1.7 2.1 2.1 0.9
North Sumatra 5.7 5.7 5.4 6.6 6.3 5.8 6.4 6.0 5.4
West Sumatra 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.2 1.8
Riau 15.1 6.5 6.8 2.1 1.9 5.0 1.9 2.0 5.5
Jambi 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9
South Sumatra 4.8 4.2 3.3 4.5 3.8 2.8 4.7 4.2 3.6
Bengkulu 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4
Lampung 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.4 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.4 1.6
Sumatra 32.2 24.9 22.2 21.0 20.1 20.0 20.6 20.1 20.2
Jakarta 8.7 12.1 17.1 11.0 13.8 18.8 10.4 9.9 16.5
West Java 14.5 16.8 17.2 16.3 17.1 18.0 17.2 19.4 19.0
Central Java 9.9 11.5 8.8 12.5 13.1 9.6 14.5 12.2 10.4
Yogyakarta 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.3 0.9
East Java 15.8 15.5 15.5 19.9 17.5 16.8 18.7 20.8 19.3
Bali 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.4 2.0 2.2 1.3
Java-Bali 51.5 58.6 61.0 62.8 64.5 65.7 64.4 65.8 67.4
Java-Bali w/o Jakarta 42.8 46.4 43.8 51.8 50.7 46.9 54.0 55.9 51.0
West Kalimantan 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.7 2.0 1.3
Central Kalimantan 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9
South Kalimantan 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.3 0.9
East Kalimantan 4.1 5.7 6.0 2.3 4.0 4.0 1.2 1.1 1.6
Kalimantan 7.1 9.1 9.3 6.1 7.9 7.5 5.4 5.4 4.6
North Sulawesi 1.3 0.8 0.8 1.6 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.7
Central Sulawesi 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
South Sulawesi 3.0 2.4 2.2 3.8 2.6 2.2 3.5 2.9 2.4
Southeast Sulawesi 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5
Sulawesi 5.0 4.1 4.2 6.3 4.5 4.3 6.2 5.3 4.4
West Nusa Tenggara 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.7
East Nusa Tenggara 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.7
Maluku 0.9 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.4
Papua 1.8 1.2 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.5
Eastern Indonesia 4.3 3.3 3.3 4.0 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.3 3.3
Indonesia (total) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
                 (current Rp. trillion) 11.9              188.3              2,202.9              9.5              165.1              1,996.0              34.0              82.5              1,182.1             
Note: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
- GRP is gross regional product
- CE is household consumption expenditure 
- Source:  BPS, Regonal income by Industry and by Expenditure
Internal Note: based on current prices
GRP Non-mining GRP CETable 2. Provincial GRP, Non-mining GRP and Consumption Expenditure per Capita
1975 1990 2004 1975 1990 2004 1983 1990 2004
Aceh 93.3 200.7 114.5 97.9 147.4 92.0 114.4 108.9 49.5
North Sumatra 101.9 99.6 92.2 116.7 110.1 100.5 111.0 104.9 92.3
West Sumatra 79.1 78.3 81.6 99.2 88.0 86.8 96.8 96.1 87.6
Riau 1061.5 352.0 245.2 150.2 103.9 178.6 128.8 106.0 198.0
Jambi 87.1 65.5 67.0 101.5 72.0 62.2 62.0 72.5 75.9
South Sumatra 160.6 118.5 92.8 150.1 107.5 77.2 144.8 119.2 100.5
Bengkulu 61.9 64.6 49.0 77.6 70.0 52.4 90.5 75.7 56.3
Lampung 72.9 50.8 48.4 91.6 57.8 50.9 62.2 70.2 48.4
Sumatra 177.0 121.7 103.1 115.3 98.1 92.9 104.8 98.4 93.9
Jakarta 212.1 262.9 419.1 267.1 299.9 460.9 224.9 214.3 403.0
West Java 78.7 84.9 85.9 88.6 86.2 89.6 91.3 97.7 94.8
Central Java 55.6 72.2 58.4 69.6 81.9 63.9 85.9 76.7 69.4
Yogyakarta 61.6 62.0 64.5 77.4 70.3 70.6 88.1 78.2 59.7
East Java 76.3 85.1 92.7 95.9 96.5 100.3 96.7 114.3 115.2
Bali 77.6 103.2 83.4 97.1 117.3 91.4 119.0 143.9 82.5
Java-Bali 79.4 94.9 103.3 96.9 104.4 111.3 101.9 106.5 114.2
Java-Bali w/o Jkt 70.5 81.3 79.8 85.4 88.7 85.3 92.2 97.8 92.7
West Kalimantan 84.2 80.3 65.8 105.9 91.1 71.8 101.9 113.0 62.2
Central Kalimantan 88.3 93.9 83.9 110.9 106.7 91.9 132.7 122.5 86.7
South Kalimantan 72.2 85.3 77.0 90.5 93.7 70.8 110.6 90.9 59.3
East Kalimantan 576.5 538.2 462.3 325.9 380.4 311.8 131.5 104.0 123.3
Kalimantan 159.2 178.4 159.8 136.6 154.0 128.2 114.7 106.3 79.2
North Sulawesi 86.9 57.7 59.6 109.0 65.2 59.9 89.6 75.6 51.9
Central Sulawesi 55.1 53.2 60.0 69.1 59.1 65.0 91.4 79.9 67.5
South Sulawesi 70.7 60.9 55.3 89.0 66.6 56.0 85.7 75.3 61.4
Southeast Sulawesi 52.7 57.6 48.5 52.8 59.6 50.8 87.6 78.6 49.8
Sulawesi 70.6 58.8 55.9 87.7 64.5 57.4 87.4 76.3 59.0
West Nusa Tenggara 45.5 37.5 50.6 56.6 42.1 36.2 53.9 51.5 35.8
East Nusa Tenggara 41.5 34.7 30.5 52.1 39.4 33.2 52.0 53.2 38.5
Maluku 91.9 76.6 29.0 113.1 82.6 31.3 89.6 84.6 38.5
Papua 226.8 126.8 123.5 111.1 72.8 69.7 84.3 54.0 126.2
Eastern Indonesia 78.1 58.2 54.6 72.5 53.6 40.8 64.1 58.5 54.3
Indonesia (index) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
       ( Current Rp. 000) 91              1,051        10,421      72             922           9,443        216           461           5,592       
Note:
- GRP is gross regional product
- PCE is personal consumption expenditure or household consumption expenditure per capita
- All provincial numbers are relative to Indonesia which is set to 100
- Source:  BPS, Regonal income by Industry and by Expenditure
Internal Note:
- Formula to calculate 
number for each 
province = GRP (province)/ GDP (Indonesia) X 100
based on current price
GRP per Capita Non-mining GRP per Capita PCETable 3. Provincial PCI 2004 (adjusted for relative prices),
Deflator 1975-2004 GRP per Capita Non-mining GRP per Capita PCE
Aceh 14.0 117.7 94.6 50.9
North Sumatra 12.2 92.3 100.6 92.4
West Sumatra 12.1 85.9 91.4 92.3
Riau 15.4 248.5 180.9 200.6
Jambi 13.5 75.3 69.9 85.3
South Sumatra 12.7 93.3 77.6 101.2
Bengkulu 12.0 52.1 55.8 59.9
Lampung 11.5 52.5 55.3 52.5
Sumatra
Jakarta 14.8 336.2 369.7 323.2
West Java 12.9 82.7 86.2 91.2
Central Java 12.4 62.8 68.6 74.6
Yogyakarta 13.7 68.6 75.1 63.5
East Java 13.4 97.2 105.2 120.8
Bali 11.1 74.3 81.4 73.5
Java-Bali
West Kalimantan 12.1 70.5 76.8 66.6
Central Kalimantan 13.3 68.7 75.2 71.0
South Kalimantan 13.1 82.5 75.8 63.4
East Kalimantan 13.7 426.1 287.4 113.7
Kalimantan
North Sulawesi 10.7 55.2 55.5 48.1
Central Sulawesi 13.3 61.5 66.6 69.2
South Sulawesi 11.7 57.8 58.6 64.3
Southeast Sulawesi 12.4 47.2 49.5 48.4
Sulawesi
West Nusa Tenggara 12.3 53.2 38.0 37.6
East Nusa Tenggara 11.4 27.7 30.1 35.0
Maluku 10.1 22.8 24.6 30.3
Papua 13.5 106.0 59.8 108.3
Eastern Indonesia
Indonesia  13.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
Relative prices are calculated by Nashihin (2006)deflator
GRP per CapitaNon-mining GRP per Capita
2002 1975 2004 1975
Aceh 102.8887 0.972385 0.127297 0.779465 5.723332 0.127297
N Sumatra 105.7197 0.99914 0.146884 0.737159 4.14115 0.146884
W Sumatra 100.5009 0.949818 0.144947 0.664541 3.951917 0.144947
Riau 104.4272 0.986925 0.090303 0.777513 5.73629 0.090303
Jambi 94.12305 0.889542 0.117603 0.688241 4.576238 0.117603
S Sumatra 105.1684 0.99393 0.140681 0.841135 4.518148 0.140681
Bengkulu 99.41498 0.939555 0.144509 0.729499 3.875709 0.144509
Lampung 97.42088 0.920709 0.176997 0.755203 4.188913 0.176997
0 0.112521 0.76342 4.729659 0.136173
Jakarta 131.9096 1.246657 0.098566 0.567206 5.364355 0.098566
W Java 109.9444 1.039067 0.13042 0.71864 4.358571 0.13042
C Java 98.52554 0.931149 0.136759 0.779703 4.018296 0.136759
Yogjakarta 99.50223 0.94038 0.090001 0.546994 3.75902 0.090001
E Java 100.8527 0.953143 0.135073 0.648547 5.114779 0.135073
Bali 118.8237 1.122983 0.155863 0.679933 3.33637 0.155863
0 0.125195 0.668263 4.680953 0.125024
W Kalimantan 98.84285 0.934148 0.136384 0.652299 3.74999 0.136384
C Kalimantan  129.1983 1.221032 0.103037 0.561431 3.883938 0.103037
S Kalimantan 98.84001 0.934121 0.095121 0.653077 3.37535 0.095121
E Kalimantan 114.7867 1.084831 0.12239 0.794153 5.023977 0.12239
0 0.118213 0.723448 4.422727 0.116392
N Sulawesi 114.0943 1.078287 0.193164 0.699839 3.725152 0.193164
C Sulawesi 103.2715 0.976002 0.131591 0.698576 4.906226 0.131591
S Sulawesi 101.1008 0.955488 0.160665 0.757599 3.935342 0.160665
S E Sulawesi  108.7887 1.028145 0.157096 0.789915 4.694931 0.157096
0 0.164061 0.741211 4.092621 0.164153
W Nusa T 100.6633 0.951352 0.139674 0.641773 4.051788 0.139674
E Nusa T  116.4276 1.100338 0.151644 0.716828 3.515055 0.151644
Maluku 134.5177 1.271305 0.165519 0.722218 2.699442 0.165519
Papua 123.344 1.165705 0.098379 0.609936 3.831947 0.098379
0 0.123695 0.660732 3.699597 0.135468
































0.681615 4.533438Table 4a. Growth Rates of Provincial GRP, Non-mining GRP and Consumption Expenditure per Capita (in %)
1976-90 1991-04 1976-04 1976-90 1991-04 1976-04 1984-90 1991-04 1984-04
Aceh 9.8 -1.8 4.0 7.2 0.8 4.1 3.3 2.7 2.9
North Sumatra 5.5 3.6 4.6 5.9 3.8 4.9 1.8 4.2 3.4
West Sumatra 6.3 4.0 5.2 5.9 4.1 5.0 3.5 4.5 4.2
Riau -5.3 -0.5 -3.0 2.6 1.7 2.2 0.8 2.7 2.1
Jambi 2.7 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.8 5.3 3.3 3.9
South Sumatra 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.9 3.5 3.2 2.2 3.9 3.3
Bengkulu 6.0 2.5 4.3 5.5 2.7 4.2 0.5 3.1 2.2
Lampung 4.3 3.9 4.1 4.2 3.8 4.0 4.7 3.1 3.6
Sumatra 1.0 2.2 1.6 4.7 3.2 4.0 2.6 3.7 3.3
Jakarta 6.3 3.7 5.0 6.3 3.7 5.0 2.8 4.2 3.7
West Java 5.6 3.7 4.6 5.8 4.0 4.9 3.7 3.9 3.9
Central Java 6.7 3.2 5.0 6.6 3.2 4.9 2.5 4.8 4.0
Yogyakarta 4.4 2.9 3.7 4.3 3.0 3.7 1.3 2.0 1.8
East Java 6.8 2.3 4.6 6.7 2.2 4.5 5.7 3.9 4.5
Bali 8.7 3.6 6.2 8.7 3.6 6.2 2.4 1.9 2.1
Java-Bali 6.5 3.1 4.9 6.5 3.2 4.9 3.8 4.0 3.9
Java-Bali w/o Jkt 6.3 3.1 4.8 6.4 3.2 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.0
West Kalimantan 5.7 2.5 4.1 5.6 2.5 4.1 4.3 2.1 2.9
Central Kalimantan 5.6 1.8 3.7 5.5 1.8 3.7 1.5 3.1 2.5
South Kalimantan 4.7 4.0 4.3 4.5 2.8 3.7 1.5 4.4 3.4
East Kalimantan 3.4 2.1 2.8 6.3 2.2 4.3 -0.2 4.9 3.2
Kalimantan 5.1 2.7 3.9 6.2 2.5 4.4 1.9 3.9 3.2
North Sulawesi 5.1 4.8 5.0 5.0 4.7 4.8 3.1 5.1 4.4
Central Sulawesi 5.1 3.4 4.2 4.9 3.4 4.2 1.3 3.7 2.9
GRP per Capita Non-mining GRP per Capita PCE
Central Sulawesi 5.1 3.4 4.2 4.9 3.4 4.2 1.3 3.7 2.9
South Sulawesi 5.1 4.0 4.6 4.9 3.9 4.4 3.3 3.7 3.6
Southeast Sulawesi 6.3 2.5 4.4 7.7 2.4 5.1 2.1 1.9 1.9
Sulawesi 5.2 3.9 4.5 5.1 3.8 4.4 2.8 3.8 3.5
West Nusa Tenggara 5.0 5.5 5.2 4.9 3.1 4.0 2.8 3.4 3.2
East Nusa Tenggara 4.9 4.2 4.5 4.8 4.2 4.5 3.0 5.0 4.3
Maluku 5.4 0.0 2.8 5.3 0.3 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.4
Papua 0.3 3.1 1.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 1.5 3.7 2.9
Eastern Indonesia 3.2 3.7 3.4 4.5 2.7 3.7 2.7 4.1 3.6
Indonesia  4.8 3.0 3.9 6.0 3.1 4.6 3.4 3.9 3.7
Note:
- GRP is gross regional product
- PCE is personal consumption expenditure or household consumption expenditure per capita
- Source:  BPS, Regonal income by Industry and by Expenditure
Internal Note:
- Formula to define 
annual growth rate growth 76-90=100*(((y90/y75)^(1/(90-75))-1)
- Formula to define 
average growth rateTable 4b. Growth Rates of Provincial GRP, Non-mining GRP and Consumption Expenditure (in %)
1976-90 1991-04 1976-04 1976-90 1991-04 1976-04 1984-90 1991-04 1984-04
Aceh 12.9 -0.7 6.1 10.3 2.0 6.2 6.1 3.8 4.6
North Sumatra 7.9 4.9 6.5 8.3 5.1 6.8 3.7 5.5 4.9
West Sumatra 8.2 4.7 6.5 7.8 4.7 6.3 5.0 5.1 5.1
Riau -1.6 3.7 0.9 6.6 6.0 6.3 5.7 7.0 6.5
Jambi 6.4 4.9 5.7 6.7 4.4 5.6 8.6 5.1 6.3
South Sumatra 5.7 4.0 4.9 6.2 4.8 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.3
Bengkulu 10.7 4.6 7.7 10.2 4.9 7.6 5.0 5.3 5.2
Lampung 8.2 5.2 6.7 8.1 5.0 6.6 6.3 4.3 5.0
Sumatra 4.0 3.8 3.9 7.8 4.8 6.3 5.1 5.3 5.2
Jakarta 9.4 4.1 6.8 9.4 4.1 6.8 4.7 4.5 4.6
West Java 8.4 5.0 6.7 8.6 5.4 7.0 6.4 5.3 5.6
Central Java 8.1 4.0 6.1 8.1 3.9 6.1 3.5 5.6 4.9
Yogyakarta 5.2 3.7 4.5 5.1 3.8 4.5 1.7 2.8 2.5
East Java 8.1 2.9 5.5 8.0 2.9 5.5 6.7 4.6 5.3
Bali 10.6 4.9 7.8 10.6 4.9 7.8 3.5 3.2 3.3
Java-Bali 8.4 4.0 6.3 8.5 4.1 6.3 5.4 4.9 5.1
Java-Bali w/o Jkt 6.3 3.1 4.8 6.4 3.2 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.0
West Kalimantan 8.4 4.6 6.6 8.4 4.6 6.5 7.4 4.2 5.3
Central Kalimantan 9.5 4.7 7.2 9.5 4.7 7.1 5.7 6.0 5.9
South Kalimantan 7.1 5.5 6.3 6.9 4.3 5.6 4.0 5.9 5.3
East Kalimantan 8.5 4.9 6.7 11.5 5.0 8.3 3.7 7.8 6.4
Kalimantan 8.3 4.9 6.7 9.5 4.7 7.1 5.2 6.1 5.8
North Sulawesi 7.1 6.1 6.6 6.9 6.1 6.5 4.5 6.5 5.8
Central Sulawesi 8.4 5.8 7.1 8.2 5.8 7.1 3.8 6.1 5.3
South Sulawesi 6.7 5.4 6.1 6.5 5.2 5.9 4.7 5.1 5.0
Southeast Sulawesi 10.1 5.5 7.8 11.5 5.4 8.5 6.2 4.9 5.3
Sulawesi 7.3 5.6 6.5 7.2 5.5 6.4 4.6 5.5 5.2
West Nusa Tenggara 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.2 4.8 6.0 5.0 5.2 5.1
East Nusa Tenggara 6.8 5.8 6.3 6.7 5.8 6.3 4.8 6.7 6.0
Maluku 8.4 1.0 4.7 8.3 1.2 4.8 5.2 3.4 4.0
Papua 3.4 6.2 4.7 5.9 5.6 5.8 5.2 6.8 6.2
Eastern Indonesia 5.7 5.5 5.6 7.0 4.5 5.8 5.1 5.9 5.6
Indonesia  7.0 4.2 5.6 8.3 4.4 6.4 5.3 5.1 5.2
Coef. Variation
Note:
- GRP is gross regional product
- CE is household consumption expenditure
- pci = 
- Source:  
GRP Non-mining GRP CETable 5. Structure of Provincial GRP (in %)
structural structural
A I S M A I S M A I S M change change
Aceh 47.3 22.8 29.9 3.5 17.9 66.4 15.7 28.7 23.9 50.2 26.0 18.3 54.8 58.7
North Sumatra 41.0 18.8 40.3 6.3 34.5 25.8 39.7 18.2 24.5 33.5 42.0 25.4 33.0 50.9
West Sumatra 43.7 16.5 39.8 9.5 31.9 18.8 49.3 12.1 24.4 22.6 53.0 12.2 38.7 41.9
Riau 2.8 91.2 6.0 2.2 5.4 81.4 13.2 6.5 16.9 67.7 15.4 30.9 46.8 109.5
Jambi 50.0 17.8 32.2 9.2 34.3 20.8 44.8 14.4 29.2 33.0 37.9 11.8 41.5 43.8
South Sumatra 20.9 47.3 31.8 19.1 18.1 44.8 37.1 19.7 19.8 54.8 25.4 22.6 15.0 24.8
Bengkulu 53.5 6.6 39.9 1.9 34.1 17.9 48.0 3.0 40.1 10.5 49.5 4.0 26.8 34.1
Lampung 56.4 9.1 34.5 7.3 41.9 14.9 43.1 10.9 37.4 22.7 39.9 11.8 38.0 43.6
Sumatra 21.8 56.4 21.8 6.4 21.9 48.2 29.9 15.7 22.8 46.8 30.4 23.1 19.2
Jakarta 1.7 23.0 75.3 15.5 1.1 37.9 61.0 26.4 0.1 27.5 72.4 15.9 8.9 39.7
West Java 34.6 22.4 43.0 8.0 21.6 39.5 38.9 20.4 12.3 53.8 33.9 42.6 62.7 77.1
Central Java 43.6 13.2 43.2 9.5 30.5 30.2 39.3 24.9 19.9 40.5 39.6 32.6 54.5 58.9
Yogyakarta 41.6 14.2 44.2 8.9 28.8 16.9 54.3 10.3 16.6 24.8 58.6 14.7 49.9 49.9
East Java 42.9 13.1 44.0 11.7 25.5 27.9 46.6 21.0 17.5 37.4 45.1 29.6 50.7 62.1
Bali 47.8 11.8 40.5 3.0 34.7 11.7 53.6 5.3 20.7 15.4 63.9 9.0 54.1 66.4
Java-Bali 33.8 17.4 48.8 10.6 20.6 33.1 46.3 22.1 11.6 39.0 49.5 29.2 44.5
West Kalimantan 51.3 13.7 35.1 10.5 27.6 23.5 48.9 18.7 27.3 29.9 42.8 19.8 47.9 54.0
Central Kalimantan 53.9 10.0 36.0 3.9 36.4 20.4 43.2 9.8 41.7 14.5 43.7 9.0 24.5 29.3
South Kalimantan 40.9 7.0 52.2 4.7 26.1 23.9 50.0 16.9 25.3 38.5 36.2 15.5 63.0 63.0
East Kalimantan 13.4 62.1 24.5 5.0 9.3 71.2 19.5 31.3 6.4 79.5 14.1 37.5 34.7 67.2
Kalimantan 28.1 40.3 31.6 6.0 16.7 53.0 30.3 25.6 14.9 61.5 23.6 29.7 42.3
North Sulawesi 45.1 8.5 46.4 4.4 35.4 12.0 52.6 5.7 21.0 32.6 46.4 9.2 48.3 59.3
Central Sulawesi 63.8 6.8 29.4 1.2 42.3 16.3 41.4 5.9 45.3 16.3 38.4 7.7 36.9 36.9
South Sulawesi 53.0 5.1 41.9 3.6 42.3 16.7 41.0 7.8 33.5 27.3 39.1 13.5 44.4 50.2
Southeast Sulawesi 43.8 23.2 33.0 1.3 40.2 14.8 45.0 2.3 41.1 19.3 39.6 6.2 13.0 36.1
Sulawesi 51.4 7.3 41.3 3.5 40.8 15.5 43.7 6.6 33.7 25.7 40.5 10.9 36.9
West Nusa Tenggara 60.8 7.0 32.2 2.4 48.0 10.5 41.6 2.8 24.7 44.8 30.5 3.4 75.5 82.6
East Nusa Tenggara 69.1 4.9 26.1 2.3 50.0 6.9 43.1 1.9 42.5 11.2 46.3 1.6 53.2 55.9
Maluku 63.3 5.3 31.4 1.1 32.8 24.7 42.4 14.4 36.5 12.6 51.0 8.1 53.7 54.4
Papua 20.3 63.9 15.9 0.5 18.1 57.3 24.6 2.4 19.0 60.1 20.9 5.6 10.1 27.4
Eastern Indonesia 45.9 30.0 24.1 1.3 34.2 29.7 36.1 5.3 26.4 42.6 30.9 4.5 39.0
Indonesia 30.9 31.6 37.5 8.2 21.9 37.9 40.3 19.6 15.8 42.4 41.8 26.3 30.3 56.0
Note:
- A = Agriculture
- I = Industry
- S = Service
- M = Manufacture
1975 1990 2004Table 5. Structure of Provincial non mining GRP (in %)
structural structural
A I S M A I S M A I S M change change
Aceh 56.8 7.3 35.9 4.2 27.8 47.8 24.4 44.5 32.8 31.5 35.7 25.2 48.4 57.9
North Sumatra 45.1 10.6 44.3 7.0 35.6 23.4 40.9 18.8 24.8 32.7 42.5 25.7 44.2 46.0
West Sumatra 44.0 16.1 40.0 9.6 32.4 17.6 50.1 12.3 25.3 19.8 54.9 12.6 37.3 39.1
Riau 25.3 21.3 53.5 19.1 20.8 28.0 51.2 25.3 25.6 51.1 23.3 46.9 60.2 61.7
Jambi 54.0 11.1 34.9 9.9 35.6 17.9 46.5 14.9 34.7 20.3 45.0 14.0 38.7 38.7
South Sumatra 28.2 28.9 42.8 25.7 22.8 30.6 46.7 24.8 26.3 40.0 33.7 30.0 22.1 31.5
Bengkulu 53.7 6.2 40.1 1.9 35.9 13.6 50.5 3.1 41.3 7.6 51.0 4.1 24.7 30.8
Lampung 56.5 9.0 34.6 7.3 42.0 14.7 43.2 11.0 39.2 19.0 41.8 12.4 34.6 38.8
Sumatra 42.1 15.7 42.1 12.4 31.0 26.8 42.2 22.3 27.9 34.9 37.3 28.3 38.2
Jakarta 1.7 23.0 75.3 15.5 1.1 37.9 61.0 26.4 0.1 27.2 72.7 15.9 8.4 39.5
West Java 38.7 13.2 48.1 9.0 24.3 32.0 43.7 23.0 13.0 51.1 35.9 45.1 75.8 80.0
Central Java 43.8 12.7 43.4 9.6 30.6 29.9 39.5 25.1 20.1 39.9 40.0 33.0 54.3 58.7
Yogyakarta 41.7 14.0 44.3 8.9 29.0 16.3 54.7 10.4 16.8 24.1 59.1 14.9 49.8 49.8
East Java 43.0 12.9 44.1 11.8 25.6 27.5 46.9 21.1 17.9 36.1 46.0 30.1 50.1 61.1
Bali 48.1 11.2 40.7 3.0 34.8 11.4 53.8 5.3 20.9 14.8 64.3 9.1 54.3 66.7
Java-Bali 34.9 14.7 50.4 11.0 21.3 30.7 47.9 22.9 11.8 37.6 50.6 29.8 46.2
West Kalimantan 51.3 13.5 35.1 10.5 27.8 23.0 49.2 18.8 27.7 29.0 43.3 20.1 47.4 53.4
Central Kalimantan 54.1 9.8 36.1 3.9 36.6 20.1 43.3 9.9 42.0 13.9 44.1 9.0 24.1 28.9
South Kalimantan 41.1 6.5 52.4 4.7 27.1 21.0 51.9 17.6 30.4 26.1 43.5 18.6 39.3 42.7
East Kalimantan 29.8 15.6 54.7 11.1 15.0 53.6 31.4 50.4 10.5 66.4 23.1 61.4 101.6 101.6
Kalimantan 41.3 12.4 46.3 8.8 22.1 37.9 40.0 33.8 20.5 47.0 32.5 40.9 69.1
North Sulawesi 45.3 8.2 46.5 4.4 35.8 11.2 53.1 5.8 23.0 26.1 50.9 10.1 44.5 52.8
Central Sulawesi 64.0 6.5 29.5 1.2 43.5 14.0 42.5 6.1 46.1 14.8 39.1 7.9 35.8 35.8
South Sulawesi 53.1 5.0 41.9 3.6 44.1 13.1 42.8 8.1 36.5 20.8 42.6 14.7 33.0 39.6
Southeast Sulawesi 55.0 3.5 41.5 1.7 44.2 6.3 49.5 2.6 43.3 15.1 41.6 6.5 23.4 30.3
Sulawesi 52.2 5.9 41.9 3.5 42.4 12.1 45.5 6.9 36.3 20.2 43.6 11.7 31.8
West Nusa Tenggara 61.6 5.7 32.6 2.4 48.7 9.1 42.2 2.9 38.1 14.8 47.1 5.2 47.1 47.1
East Nusa Tenggara 69.2 4.6 26.1 2.3 50.3 6.4 43.3 1.9 43.1 9.8 47.1 1.7 52.2 54.7
Maluku 64.8 3.1 32.1 1.1 34.8 20.4 44.9 15.2 37.3 10.5 52.2 8.3 54.9 55.6
Papua 52.1 7.1 40.8 1.4 36.0 15.2 48.8 4.7 37.3 21.9 40.9 11.0 29.7 42.8
Eastern Indonesia 62.3 5.1 32.7 1.8 42.4 13.0 44.7 6.5 39.0 15.3 45.7 6.6 46.5
Indonesia 39.0 13.8 47.2 10.3 24.9 29.1 45.9 22.4 17.4 36.4 46.2 29.0 45.1 53.7
Note:
- A = Agriculture
- I = Industry
- S = Service
- M = Manufacture
1975 1990 2004Table 6. Demography (in %)
Growth of Population
Total dependency
1971 2000 1971-00 2005 1971 2000
Aceh 1.7 2.0 2.4 36.3 33.6 66.9
North Sumatra 5.5 5.6 1.9 37.4 93.5 162.5
West Sumatra 2.3 2.1 1.5 37.4 42.3 64.2
Riau 1.4 2.3 3.7 33.7 13.2 38.3
Jambi 0.8 1.2 3.1 33.9 16.2 38.7
South Sumatra 2.9 3.8 2.8 33.5 33.3 75.1
Bengkulu 0.4 0.8 3.9 34.8 24.6 74.1
Lampung 2.3 3.3 3.1 34.7 81.8 196.2
Sumatra 17.4 21.0 2.5 35.5 38.4 79.2
Jakarta 3.8 4.1 2.1 27.1 7955.2 14491.5
West Java 18.2 21.5 2.5 33.9 440.9 892.1
Central Java 18.3 15.2 1.2 33.6 634.1 896.3
Yogyakarta 2.1 1.5 0.8 30.4 791.8 993.8
East Java 21.4 17.0 1.1 30.9 539.6 734.0
Bali 1.8 1.5 1.4 31.9 377.3 559.7
Java-Bali 65.6 60.9 1.6 32.4 557.9 884.5
West Kalimantan 1.7 1.8 2.1 34.9 12.9 23.8
Central Kalimantan 0.6 0.9 3.3 34.9 4.5 11.5
South Kalimantan 1.4 1.5 2.0 33.2 49.1 86.0
East Kalimantan 0.6 1.2 4.2 32.6 3.6 12.1
Kalimantan 4.3 5.4 2.6 33.9 9.4 19.9
North Sulawesi 1.4 1.4 1.7 34.0 70.8 115.4
Central Sulawesi 0.8 1.0 2.8 36.0 10.3 22.7
South Sulawesi 4.3 3.8 1.4 35.7 62.6 94.3
Southeast Sulawesi 0.6 0.9 3.2 38.3 22.3 55.4
Sulawesi 7.1 7.1 1.8 35.8 37.5 63.2
West Nusa Tenggara 1.9 1.9 1.9 37.1 101.7 176.2
East Nusa Tenggara 1.9 1.9 1.7 41.7 47.1 77.9
Maluku 0.9 0.9 1.8 38.0 13.0 21.7
Papua 0.8 1.0 2.9 36.3 2.2 5.1
Eastern Indonesia 5.5 5.7 2.0 38.6 11.5 20.4
Indonesia (total) 100.0 100.0 1.9 33.7 58.9 100.6
                (000.000) 119.3 203.91                 
Note: In-migration is calsulated from average (arithmatic) annual recent migration
         average Growth of total population is calculated using geometric average
Source: Population census 1971 and 2000, Papua and Aceh in 2000 has been reestimated by BPS
Population Population DensityTable 7. The estimation result of per capita GDP absolute β convergence
Initial value Constant Adj. R
2
Initial value Constant Adj. R
2
Initial value Constant Adj. R
2
1975-2002
a -0.015*** 0.033*** 0.539 -0.004 0.038*** 0.022 -0.002 0.032*** -0.03
-5.493 12.782 -1.25 13.77 -0.529 11.342
1975-1981 -0.020** 0.053*** 0.188 -0.01 0.057*** 0.025
-2.608 7.561 -1.28 9.43
1981-1986
a -0.028*** 0.028*** 0.301 0.001 0.037*** -0.042 -0.017** 0.012** 0.178
-3.433 4.624 0.07 5.1 -2.534 2.357
1986-1992 -0.017*** 0.050*** 0.313 -0.008 0.051*** 0.021 -0.007 0.025*** -0.002
-3.52 15.504 -1.24 16.12 -0.971 4.957
1992-1997 -0.010* 0.052*** 0.084 -0.003 0.050*** -0.027 0.018 0.050*** 0.024
-1.814 12.852 -0.58 17.62 1.268 6.121
1997-2002 -0.007 0.005 -0.016 -0.001 -0.001 -0.041 -0.018 0.030*** 0.056
-0.777 0.682 -0.16 -0.23 -1.575 4.987
Note: *, **, and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively. 
a starting from 1983 for household consumption regression
GRP per Capita Non-mining GRP per Capita PCETable 8. Survey of Absolute Convergence Research in Developing Countries
Author country year proxy of income Absolute convergence (-b)
Cashin & Sahay (1996) India (20 states) 1961-1991 NDP per capita -0.0012
Klump and Nguyen (2004) Vietnam (61) 1995-2000 GRP per capita 0.0030
GRP per worker 0.0140
Balisacan & Fuwa (2003) Phillipines (20) 1988-1997 GDP per capita 0.1070
Garcia & Sulistianingsih (1998) Indonesia (26) 1975-1993 GDP per capita 0.0237
1980-1993 0.0187
1983-1993 0.0170
Jian, Sach and Warner (1996) China (15) 1952-1965 0.0060
1965-1978 -0.0160








Mexico (30) 1970-2003 GDP per capita 0.0019
1970-1985 0.0224
1985-2003 -0.0137Table 9. Social Indicators
1971 2000 1971 2000 1984 2002
Aceh 143 40 2.3 6.0 14.3 29.8
North Sumatra 121 44 2.7 6.1 22.6 15.8
West Sumatra 152 53 2.6 5.6 23.8 11.6
Riau 146 48 1.8 6.0 29.1 13.6
Jambi 154 53 1.9 5.3 27.7 13.2
South Sumatra 155 53 1.9 5.3 34.1 21.1
Bengkulu 167 53 1.6 5.5 16.7 22.7
Lampung 146 48 1.6 5.1 54.5 24.1
Sumatra
Jakarta 129 25 4.0 8.4 13.7 3.4
West Java 167 59 1.9 5.5 19.4 12.6
Central Java 144 44 1.4 5.0 37.9 23.1
Yogyakarta 102 25 2.3 6.6 30.1 20.1
East Java 120 48 1.6 5.1 29.1 21.9
Bali 130 36 1.4 5.9 34.4 6.9
Java-Bali
West Kalimantan 144 57 1.1 4.3 47.0 15.5
Central Kalimantan 129 48 2.3 5.4 29.4 11.9
South Kalimantan 165 70 1.9 5.1 22.4 8.5
East Kalimantan 104 40 2.0 6.3 37.7 12.2
Kalimantan
North Sulawesi 114 37 2.9 6.0 26.7 17.4
Central Sulawesi 150 66 2.4 5.3 45.7 24.9
South Sulawesi 161 57 1.9 4.9 24.7 15.9
Southeast Sulawesi 167 53 1.4 4.9 29.1 24.2
Sulawesi
West Nusa Tenggara 221 89 1.0 3.9 53.8 27.8
East Nusa Tenggara 154 57 1.9 4.0 52.9 30.7
Maluku 143 66 2.7 5.6 31.7 26.6
Papua 86a) 57 4.2a) 4.3 27.2 41.8
Eastern Indonesia
Indonesia 145 47 1.9 5.4 29.5 18.2
coefficient of Variation 0.184 0.262 0.357 0.164 0.362 0.439
Note:
a) = urban area only




1976-04 1976-04 1984-04 1984 2002 1971 2004 1971 2000 2003
Aceh 2.4 1.6 1.5 0.26 0.28 97.0 97.3 3.1 5.8 23.4
North Sumatra 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.26 0.29 60.3 65.4 8.3 3.9 4.1
West Sumatra 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.26 0.29 98.7 97.8 1.0 5.8 6.6
Riau 2.7 3.5 1.8 0.26 0.34 83.4 88.6 13.0 32.3 5.4
Jambi 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.20 0.27 97.2 96.2 15.9 23.5 6.0
South Sumatra 2.1 2.0 1.6 0.27 0.30 94.2 95.8 9.7 13.9 3.5
Bengkulu 0.9 1.0 1.3 0.21 0.30 97.4 97.5 7.0 22.7 2.6
Lampung 1.4 1.5 1.7 0.29 0.27 94.4 95.6 36.2 22.3 3.5
Sumatra 14.3
Jakarta 1.2 1.2 1.6 0.29 0.39 84.3 85.7 40.1 42.4 13.5
West Java 1.2 1.2 1.9 0.30 0.32 97.8 97.3 1.8 11.5 7.0
Central Java 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.31 0.29 96.4 96.8 1.2 2.3 5.8
Yogyakarta 1.1 1.1 1.6 0.34 0.41 93.5 91.8 4.1 12.3 5.0
East Java 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.31 0.32 96.9 97.1 1.2 2.2 3.5
Bali 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.29 0.33 93.3 87.4 1.1 7.0 7.6
Java-Bali 8.6
West Kalimantan 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.25 0.32 42.7 57.6 1.2 7.2 4.0
Central Kalimantan 1.4 1.4 2.1 0.29 0.27 54.7 74.1 5.6 23.5 2.4
South Kalimantan 0.7 1.0 1.5 0.26 0.30 96.2 97.1 3.9 12.1 1.4
East Kalimantan 3.2 1.7 2.1 0.36 0.33 68.4 85.0 7.2 35.0 4.5
Kalimantan 17.4
North Sulawesi 2.1 2.2 2.4 0.35 0.29 48.3 49.8 2.9 6.2 8.4
Central Sulawesi 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.30 0.30 72.4 78.4 5.6 18.4 11.9
South Sulawesi 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.35 0.30 88.8 89.2 1.4 3.5 5.7
Southeast Sulawesi 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.32 0.29 98.0 95.3 3.6 20.7 5.6
Sulawesi 8.2
West Nusa Tenggara 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.30 0.28 99.5 96.6 1.6 2.8 13.8
East Nusa Tenggara 0.7 0.7 1.3 0.31 0.29 52.0 53.9 0.6 2.8 11.6
Maluku 3.7 3.7 4.7 0.30 0.25 49.9 62.4 4.0 7.5 14.5
Papua 4.1 3.1 1.2 0.37 0.38 56.3 59.9 22.5 19.6 3.3
Eastern Indonesia 6.1
Indonesia  1.0 0.9 1.0 0.32 0.35 87.5 88.2 4.9 10.1
Note:
- conflict =
- religion = 
- born outside region =
etc
a = number of 2001
c.v. of growth per capita
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Figure 3. Regional Income Equality 1975-2004
GRP per capita














































Note: in Current prices